ABSTRACT

Covering three administrations--Reagan, Clinton, and Bush--this study represents an effort to illustrate that the United States has been involved in three separate wars on terrorism. Similarly, this study explicates that, beginning with Ronald Reagan, and then through Bill Clinton, the United States failed to address several critical issues: why did the efforts of Reagan and Clinton to wage war on terror end unsuccessfully? What lessons can be learned from the policies of the two previous presidents? Having begun the nation's third war on terror against al Qaeda, what chance of success does George W. Bush have in defeating the Osama bin Laden-led transnational terror organization?

INTRODUCTION

In the halls of selected elements of America's national security bureaucracy, a strategy to defeat al Qaeda in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11 was crafted. For President George W. Bush and his national security planners, the debate about the administration's response had an all too familiar ring. On August 7, 1998, following twin al Qaeda terrorist strikes that destroyed two American embassies in East-Africa, President Bill Clinton envisaged a similar dilemma: how would the U.S. respond to a transnational threat that declared jihad on America and its far flung interests? For many in official Washington, the answer was clear: follow Ronald Reagan's example.

On April 15, 1986, terrorists loyal to Muammar Qaddafi (they were assisted by members of the Libyan diplomatic corps and state intelligence assets that planned and organized the raid) detonated a bomb in a crowded La Belle discotheque in Berlin, resulting in the death of many including an American soldier. Following burgeoning domestic outrage, President Reagan took concerted action after the release of "irrefutable evidence":

Already a fleet of warships led by the carriers Coral Sea and Saratoga were on station within range of Libya. Aircraft from the Sixth Fleet were briefed for a strike on Benghazi and a flying tanker force was mustered to fuel British-based F-111s for attack on Qaddafi's Revolutionary Headquarters and other terrorist centers in Tripoli. At last retribution was delivered. There can be no doubt about the efficacy of the air strike when it came. It destroyed terrorist centers and communications end the effect upon Colonel Qaddafi himself was dramatic ... he disappeared end went silent for several days. (1)

Gloating over the devastation and impact of the strikes, President Reagan stated that Qaddafi was "put back in his box," and warned, "we are going to defend ourselves, and we are certainly going to take action in the face of specific terrorist threats." (2) For President Reagan, the point was clear: the United States will not tolerate state-sponsored terrorism.

In the current context, for those inside and outside of government clamoring for the continuation of the Reagan model, two points illustrate that approach would have had less success in the post-9/11 world. First, al Qaeda represented a transnational organization with entities in over 60 countries, and it was one thing to target fixed and visible targets within a state, but an...