HANNAH ARENDT IS CELEBRATED AS ONE OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS of our time. But is such a celebration truly legitimate? Indeed, as surprising and as paradoxical as it may seem, Hannah Arendt has always demonstrated a strong opposition to political philosophy and to its tradition of thought. Despite almost unanimous recognition of Arendt, the idiom "political philosophy"--and the institutions that are born of it--are highly problematic. For the author of The Human Condition, under the guise of a supposedly happy alliance between the substantive and the qualifier, "political philosophy" willingly conceals a conflict between philosophy and politics and bears the threat of the sovereignty of one over the other. This conflict is extremely profound since it represents opposition not only between two academic disciplines but between two modes of existence that seek to establish a hierarchy--excellence being attributed to one of them, in this case, the bios theoretikos at the expense of the bios politicos.

Little surprise, then, that a philosopher critical of the concept of sovereignty attacks the general configuration of political philosophy. Indeed, Arendt is aware of the necessity of rejecting the model of competence in the political realm in order to better recognize the inherent political capacity of all; her resolve is to struggle against the government of philosophers, of "those who know over those who do not know." In order to fully comprehend the "contra political philosophy" that Arendt puts forth, what better vantage point than that of her critical interpretation of Plato's thought? Did the author of the Republic not edify or institute political philosophy away from and even against the polis?

In a letter dated May 8, 1954, in which she attempts to explain to Heidegger the broad outline of her work, Arendt writes,

Starting with the parable of the cave (and your interpretation of it), a representation of the traditional relationship between philosophy and politics, [we see] actually the attitude of Plato and Aristotle toward the polis as the basis of all political theories. (It seems to me decisive that Plato makes the agathon [the good] the highest idea--and not the kalon ]the beautiful]--for political reasons) (Hannah Arendt-artin Heidegger letter, 1925-1975).

Two years later, July 1, 1956, in a letter to Karl Jaspers, Arendt once again speaks of Plato's position:

It seems to me that in the Republic Plato wanted to "apply" his own theory of ideas to politics, even though that theory had very different origins. Heidegger, it seems to me, is particularly off base in using the cave simile to interpret and "criticize" Plato's theory of ideas, but he is right when he says that in the presentation of the cave simile, truth is transformed on the sly into correctness and, consequently, ideas into standards (Arendt and Jaspers, 1992: 288).

From these letters, three essential points can be drawn:

* The importance of the allegory of the cave, which is the heart of Plato's political philosophy. Arendt also adds the importance of Heidegger's interpretation in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." Here we must...