THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH. Steven G. Calabresi (1) and Christopher S. Yoo. (2) New Haven: Yale University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii +544. $60.00.

Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo's book The Unitary Executive presents an excellent inquiry into the concept of a centralized executive throughout our history. The authors' goal is to persuade the reader that all presidents have viewed the power to supervise and remove subordinates as central to the very meaning of "executive power" in Article II of the Constitution. Without such an ability, presidents would be unable to execute the law effectively and place their stamp on the administration. The authors succeed in attaining that goal, for the record they portray reveals a long tradition of forceful assertion of presidential rights to control policy through close supervision of officers within the executive branch.

In assessing the history, the authors focus on "the president's constitutional power to remove and direct subordinates, including those in entities like the Treasury Department, the Post Office, federal prosecutors, and the independent agencies that some have said are beyond presidential powers of control" (p. 418). All forty-three presidents (prior to the current Administration) have embraced a conception of the unitary executive that at least encompasses the powers to remove and supervise their subordinates' exercise of delegated authority so as to create one centralized executive branch. Moreover, an unbroken historical practice, in their view, lends considerable force to the contemporary question of whether the unitary executive ideal is grounded in the Constitution. (4) Their normative view embraces the unitary executive concept, and they accordingly critique current doctrine, in particular, the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, (5) for permitting Congress to limit the executive's removal authority over agency officials (pp. 377-78). To them, the existence of independent agencies cannot be squared with the historical recognition of the importance of the president's removal authority. (6)

Had the authors only addressed the removal authority, (7) their argument would have been convincing. But the authors claim to be addressing the entire panoply of authorities that can be traced to the unitary executive. The authors never delineate which powers--other than the appointment and removal authorities-are critical to the unitary executive ideal. (8) Thus, it is difficult, at times, to ascertain whether the authors present a historical incident to further their thesis that presidents have consistently asserted a particular power, like the removal authority, or rather merely to applaud a president's actions.

For example, the authors write of President Lincoln's unilateral efforts to prepare the Union for war (pp. 165-69), but it is not clear why. A presidential power to act outside of congressional will, which they at times criticize (pp. 174-78), seems far from falling within a unitary ideal. Moreover, they describe at length the Supreme Court decision in In re Neagle, (9) which affirmed a realm of inherent presidential power in sustaining an executive branch decision--in the absence of congressional authorization--to detail a marshal to protect the life of a threatened Supreme...