The economic effects of the direct regulation of the taxicab industry in metropolitan Toronto

Citation metadata

Author: D. Wayne Taylor
Date: June 1989
From: The Logistics and Transportation Review(Vol. 25, Issue 2)
Publisher: University of British Columbia
Document Type: Article
Length: 4,476 words

Main content

Abstract :

The regulation of taxicabs in Toronto is analyzed as an example of the "producer protection hypothesis." The effect of entry regulations is to reduce the number of cabs and raise the the fare relative to an unregulated market. This transfers income from consumers to producers, plus imposing a deadweight loss on society. By 1987, regulation had resulted in a price about 25 percent higher than if market was unprotected. These potential rents are reflected in the value of a taxi license, about $95,000 in 1987. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Source Citation

Source Citation
Taylor, D. Wayne. "The economic effects of the direct regulation of the taxicab industry in metropolitan Toronto." The Logistics and Transportation Review, vol. 25, no. 2, June 1989, p. 169+. Accessed 3 Aug. 2021.
  

Gale Document Number: GALE|A7599576