The British Special Operations Executive [SOE], set up by the War Cabinet in 1940 to conduct subversive warfare, has provoked lasting controversy amongst historians. M. R. D. Foot comments that `Those of us ... who were in resistance know that [SOE] did well; at some times, in some places, with some people, it did very well'. In contrast, John Keegan writes that `the Special Operations Executive, though puffed by a powerful lobby of historians ... largely fails in its claim to have contributed significantly to Hitler's defeat'. The gradual release to the Public Record Office of the surviving SOE records at last provides an opportunity for non-official historians to test conflicting interpretations of SOE, not against the haze of memory, but against the documentary record. Furthermore, some of the new releases concern regions not previously appreciated as centres of SOE activity. One such area with particularly extensive and detailed records is French East Africa or Madagascar, and the evidence on SOE's ambitious operations there provides a case-study for testing the organization's effectiveness.(1)

But SOE has not merely divided historians. It also engendered strong animosities in Whitehall during its brief operational life. Part of its organization was taken from the Secret Intelligence Service [SIS], and David Stafford writes that `the latter never accepted the SOE-SIS divorce of 1940, and its subsequent behaviour only too often resembled that of an embittered ex-spouse'. Relations between SIS and SOE were also blighted by their clash of functions. SIS needed tranquillity to collect intelligence, but SOE's subversion inevitably caused a rumpus. The Foreign Office saw SOE as a potential threat to British diplomacy and sought to frustrate its initiatives through splitting hairs over the precise terms under which SOE could mount operations in a particular region. Although the War Office had some hopes of SOE, occasionally senior military figures in London displayed the same suspicious hatred towards the organization as did Brigadier Stewart Menzies, head of SIS. The RAF Chief of Staff told Gladwyn Jebb, SOE's Executive officer, that `the dropping of men dressed in civilian clothes for the purpose of attempting to kill members of the opposing forces is not an operation with which the Royal Air Force should be associated'. SOE's feelings about the obstructionism it encountered in London were bitterly summed up by its first Minister, Hugh Dalton, who in November 1941 scribbled on a memo: `This is a slow war of attrition, and slowest of all in Whitehall.'(1)

How far was the hostility of senior figures in London towards SOE reflected by their representatives in the field? How much co-operation from other agencies was SOE able to obtain for mounting its operations against Madagascar? SOE's first and most successful agent there was Percy Mayer, born a British subject on Mauritius but naturalized French. Mayer represented the Ford Motor Company and had a variety of other business interests. In the opinion of one SOE officer he was `a man of great charm, absolutely fearless and very clear minded'. On 22 November 1940 the United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa, Lord Harlech, reported by telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that `Mayer is ready to put his services at the disposal of the British authorities in order to assist in any way possible detachment of the island from allegiance to Vichy ... principal way in which he thinks he could help would be by providing ... communication through wireless set ... He could take instructions and endeavour to furnish any information required.' The telegram was passed to Major Desmond Morton, Churchill's adviser on intelligence matters. Morton was based at 10 Downing Street and chaired a co-ordinating committee on French Resistance which bore his name. On 25 November the Morton Committee passed the telegram to Gladwyn Jebb, SOE's Central Executive Officer. In January 1941 Dalton accepted the Morton Committee's recommendation that SOE should conduct and control subversive operations in Madagascar. On 31 January the Treasury sanctioned expenditure up to 4,000 [pounds sterling] to cover Mayer's costs. SOE engaged Lieutenant F. Wedlake RNVR to run its Madagascar Mission with responsibility for Mayer. He was `to endeavour to influence Madagascar and Reunion in favour of Free France away from Vichy'. Wedlake was to set up a base in Cape Town, develop propaganda into Madagascar and undertake `any other subversive or other activities in Madagascar or Reunion subject to the policy of H.M. Government, as laid down in London'.(1)

Wedlake arrived in Cape Town on 13 March 1941. He met Mayer and provided him with a wireless. On his return to Tananarive, the capital of Madagascar, Mayer installed the wireless in a false ceiling over his bathroom. The radio was usually operated by his French wife, a talented pianist who quickly found a key touch much admired by the receiving operators in the Union. On 21 March Wedlake reported to London that Mayer `will not, and I agree should not, distribute propaganda. His position is dangerous ... I was just as much impressed by [Mayer] as were ... others who have seen him and I think he will do very good work for us.' Wedlake consolidated his promising start by establishing good relations with the Governor of Mauritius, Sir Bede Clifford, who became a very enthusiastic patron of SOE. The regional potentates of the British Empire such as Clifford could prove far more flexible and helpful in their relations with SOE than the denizens of Whitehall. Working from Mauritius, SOE organized and financed a covert radio station, France Libre d'Outremer, which broadcast to Madagascar on such matters as the corruption and idiosyncratic appetites of its Vichy officials. SOE also helped with an overt broadcaster, Radio Phonique de L'Ile Maurice. After SO1, the propaganda arm of SOE, was reorganized separately as the Political Warfare Executive [PWE] in August 1941, SOE's East African Mission carried out its Mauritius propaganda activities as the agent of the PWE. Though Clifford was eager to help SOE, he did not believe propaganda would solve the Madagascar problem. On 17 September 1941 Clifford reported to London that `I am convinced, and Mayer confirms, that propaganda alone will never alter the political situation in Madagascar. No internal initiative can be expected because of the lack of leaders, apathy of the population, and the self-supporting character of the Colony. The Colony appears to be under the effective control of less than a hundred administrative and service officers, who are unlikely to be influenced by our propaganda.' The Vichy ruling elite on Madagascar was tough, determined and functioned as an obedient hierarchy following the Governor's orders. The Nazis believed it to be one of the colonies `most loyal' to Vichy. Vichy colonial authorities saw Britain as the main enemy of the French Empire, with sinister designs on her territory. The Royal Navy's bombardment of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July 1940 had provided confirmation of British villainy. Politically the island was a much tougher nut to crack than Morton and SOE had hoped.(1)

In May 1941 Morton urged SOE to co-ordinate its Madagascar activities with the Free French. On 28 May Jebb wrote to Morton seeking policy clarification. Jebb suggested that `our objective should be the occupation of Madagascar by the Free French, assisted by the British, as soon as the necessary forces are available ... we should lay plans to suborn or bribe a few persons that count, either:- (a) to obtain a surrender on the arrival of the Free French Fleet and Free French Forces, or (b) to bring about a coup d'etat from inside supported by these forces'. Two days later Morton sent Jebb a reply urging SOE to mount bolder operations: `You suggest two alternatives (a) and (b) in your letter. Is there not a dim possibility of (c), namely by bribery, corruption, murder ... you may even be able to bring about a change of regime in Madagascar without the external aid of armed force?'(2)

Jebb passed Morton's letter to Julius Hanau, who was the key London figure in the planning of SOE's African operations. Julian Amery, who had worked earlier under Hanau in the Balkans, described him as `a very experienced arms dealer ... familiar with those subterfuges which, then as now, play an essential part in the sale of arms, in particular bribery ... "Caesar" was the pseudonym selected for him by the combination of his first name and appearance: there was also a spark of genius in him to justify the choice.' According to Amery, Hanau knew more about the Balkans than any living Englishman, so he was put in charge of SOE's African operations. But in fact Hanau was South African and both his peacetime and wartime experience made him very suitable for the post. From summer 1941, as head of Section W at 55 Park Lane, Hanau began to build up SOE's African Missions, operating under London cover of the Inter-Services Research Bureau. Hanau discussed Morton's letter with Sir Frank Nelson, the first executive head of SOE, who assumed the symbol `CD'. Following their talk, on 4 June Hanau telegramed Wedlake asking him to consult Mayer about the possibilities of a coup d'etat in Madagascar: `anything possible by large scale bribery even to extent dollar pensions obviously cheaper than naval military operation. If bribery alone inadequate physical liquidation Governor and other Vichy and pro-Axis extremists clearly indicated. Is this practical?' No comment from the field on the assassination proposal survives in the files. This project bore out the comment made by Oliver Harvey that Morton had `enthusiasm without wisdom'. Wedlake did reject explicitly a coup d'etat as completely out of the question. (1)

Morton's interest suggested that south-east Africa was a promising field for SOE expansion. Accordingly an SOE memo of 4 August 1941 set out detailed terms of reference for an East African Mission which were approved by interested government departments. Roger Makins of the Foreign Office told Colonel Taylor that `So far as the Foreign Office is concerned [we] do not wish to raise any objection to the proposed Mission'. On II August 1941 SOE reported to the Treasury that `it has now been decided that, subject to necessary treasury approval, a Mission on the same lines as the West African Mission but on a smaller scale should establish organizations along the East African seaboard, in which Mission will be merged the activities in connection with the Madagascar operations.' The Treasury approved SOE's bid for 3,000 [pounds sterling] a month to cover the total expenditure of the new East African Mission. SOE envisaged three original purposes for the Mission: `the penetration of Madagascar'; the `neutralising of enemy influence and activities affecting the internal situation in Portuguese East Africa'; and `the countering of all enemy activities directed against neighbouring territories from Portuguese East Africa'. In August 1941 Lt. Colonel John Todd, the senior partner in a stockbroking firm, was appointed the Mission's Head, and Wedlake was moved to other duties. Hanau was careful to include a wireless technician, H. J. Legg, among the personnel of the East African Mission, in view of the vast territories it covered and the problems which had arisen from neglecting wireless communication in the past.(2)

But while SOE was busily organizing its new Mission, a campaign began to stifle the latter at birth. First, the Governor of Kenya protested to the Colonial Office. Then his ally, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief East Africa, Sir William Platt, entered the fray. Platt had a reputation for enforcing efficiency through terror. In his previous post, as C-in-C Sudan, he had taken part in the liberation of Abyssinia, during which an SOE-inspired Military Mission had shown excessive autonomy. Furthermore, an SOE officer had asked for a supply drop of contraceptives for his personal use in a message which was routinely copied to Platt, and this had left an unfortunate impression. On 18 September 1941 Platt telegraphed his disapproval of the new Mission to the War Office: `Consider Mission unnecessary ... Proposal that sabotage and fifth column activities should be included in task of Mission presumably refers to adjacent territories. Slightest intimation such a Mission existed would have fatal effect relations territories concerned which are at present friendly and co-operative ... If in spite of my recommendations Mission despatched must emphasize strongly that Mission's activities in all respects should be under control G.O.C. in C. East Africa Command.'(1)

The Colonial Secretary Lord Moyne latched on to the objections raised in East Africa. On 24 September he wrote to Dalton that `I have never been very happy about this idea [of an East African SOE Mission] ... In the light of these objections I think we must have a definite decision whether the Mission is to proceed or not ... despatching further personnel should wait until its head has been able to convince the local civil and military authorities of the value of the scheme.' Moyne suggested that the mission should only be regarded as exploratory as far as Portuguese territory was concerned. On 10 October Eden wrote to Moyne agreeing with this suggestion. The concern of these various authorities was that the East African Mission would damage Anglo-Portuguese relations.(2)

On 10 October Hanau noted in a memo to Brien Clarke that, due to the reopening of policy questions by Lord Moyne, the Mission's status `vis-a-vis the Foreign, Colonial, Dominions and War Offices lacks the official recognition necessary for an approach to be made to secure communications and other facilities. During a period which exceeds that required by Hitler to conquer and occupy the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and France, we have striven in vain to constitute, organise and despatch a small mission to East Africa.' SOE's resentment over its ambush by Whitehall was further reflected in a paper Brien Clarke prepared for its Daily Council Meeting on 15 October. Clarke pointed out that `certain simple-minded businessmen have taken HMG at its word ... [and] ... have recruited suitable personnel ... in certain cases persuading them to give up posts where they were quite happily and suitably employed'. The upshot of the Whitehall correspondence started by Moyne was that three officers were in transit but would arrive without terms of reference and in one case without cover; and two further officers who had been expecting to leave for Africa were now twiddling their thumbs in Park Lane.(3)

Dalton effectively focused the internal SOE discussion in a telling reply to Moyne on 20 October. He stressed that it was essential to have an outpost in Portuguese East Africa because it was the only territory from which any open relations could be maintained with Madagascar:

`The entire "Mission" was established and despatched with the knowledge and consent of your Department. Either to withdraw the Mission now, or so to restrict its functions that it has virtually nothing to do would, I suggest, make not only you and me but also HMG as a whole look rather foolish. Further I have the strong impression that the local authorities are shouting out before they are hurt.' If Moyne was still reluctant to authorize the departure of the remaining members of the Mission, Dalton proposed an early meeting of the Ministers responsible, `since I fear that, in such circumstances, I should be forced to contemplate abandoning the whole project, including action against Madagascar'.(1)

A meeting of interested ministers, civil servants and General Platt was duly held at the Dominions Office on 29 October 1941. Platt argued that the Mission's base of operations should, if possible, be within the area of his Command in order that co-ordination might be preserved: in other words, so that he could tell it what to do. Strang, who was representing Eden, stressed that `the Foreign Secretary had felt certain misgivings and had only concurred on the understanding that the Mission was a very small one with adequate cover'. Dalton explained that the Mission would consist of only six people, and eventually it was agreed that Todd should visit Nairobi for discussions with General Platt. Within two days of the meeting Moyne finally came round and telephoned Dalton to say that he no longer objected to the despatch of the remaining members of the Todd Mission.(2)

Ironically the first significant success of SOE in Southern Africa probably came just too late to influence Moyne's decision. In late October 1941 Madame Mayer sent a wireless message with the news that a Vichy convoy of five ships had sailed from Madagascar. This enabled the Royal Navy to intercept the convoy and capture 40,000 tons of shipping. On 13 November 1941 the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral John H. Godfrey, wrote to congratulate Nelson: `I hear that it was in fact the wife of one of your men who made the vital signal stating that the convoy had sailed from Madagascar. This message was the first intimation to the Naval Authorities that the ships had sailed, and dispositions were taken accordingly ... I am writing this letter ... to congratulate you on the very rich prize which has fallen to our joint efforts. If there is any way in which you can pass to the lady concerned an expression of our gratitude, I would very much like you to do so. It was a very fine show indeed.' Nelson did not receive many letters like this. Following this SOE-inspired success, the German Armistice Commission which controlled the deployment of Vichy armed forces prohibited reinforcement of French Indian Ocean territories. Although the Vichy Secretariat of Marine possessed growing intelligence of British designs on Madagascar, no naval reinforcements were sent during the crucial early months of 1942. Madame Mayer's signal had a remarkable dividend.(1)

SOE's bargaining position with regard to the East African Mission was transformed not so much by its own achievements as by the deteriorating situation in the Far East. During the early stages of SOE's interest in Southern Africa the threat from Japan had seemed remote. But on 27 November 1941 the Chiefs of Staff discussed a rumour that Vichy was about to grant bases on Madagascar to the Japanese or indeed to cede them the entire island. Naval experts argued that Britain should occupy the major port of Diego Suarez as a precaution. On 28 November S.G.A. Parsons of the War Office wrote to SOE that `the War Office are particularly anxious that the activities of the Mission in Madagascar should proceed'. SOE were asked to send a representative to a meeting that same day of the Executive Planning Staff at the War Office to explain what the East African Mission could do. The SOE representative at the meeting gained the impression that an operation against Madagascar was being planned to take place in three or four months' time. On 29 November the Chiefs invited SOE `to press on with the perfection of their Madagascar organisation'. This unequivocal statement from the Chiefs provided SOE with a trump card in Whitehall disputes, and it now sought to exploit the Japanese danger in order to cut through the vested interests of other departments and to implement the expansion of the East African Mission on SOE's terms.(2)

On 11 December 1941 Jebb pointed out in a memo to the Colonial Office that the new developments in the Far East made `the Japanese seizure of Madagascar a very real possibility'. Jebb signalled that SOE would shortly be putting up proposals for expanding and reorganizing the Todd Mission. Meanwhile they would like the Colonial Office to telegraph the Chairman of the East African Governors' Conference, referring to the Chiefs' statement and alerting him to the imminent arrival of new proposals. Arthur Dawe of the Colonial Office quickly produced a draft telegram which he sent to SOE for comment. This draft left out mention of the Chiefs' statement. Brien Clarke commented to Jebb that `we ... feel very strongly that the reference to the Chiefs of Staff meeting, included in the original draft you sent to Dawe, should be included in the outgoing telegram'. The Colonial Office duly sent out the telegram as redrafted by SOE on 15 December. The redrafting of other Ministries' documents provides a good test of the realities of power in wartime Whitehall. To judge from the files of the East African Mission, SOE was usually on the receiving end of this, but the growing apprehension of Japan gave the African Section a brief taste of power.(1)

On 17 December Jebb forwarded to the Foreign, Colonial and Dominions Offices a memo from Colonel G. E Taylor, SOE's de facto Director of Operations, concerning the East African Mission. His document pointed out that `the outbreak of war with Japan, coupled with our own and the American naval losses, make a Japanese descent on Madagascar a very real possibility. If, however, some coup d'etat could be organised in the island and a friendly government installed, there is no doubt that the task of the Japanese would be rendered much more difficult. For these reasons alone it seems desirable that all possible restrictions on Todd's efforts should at once be removed irrespective of any political risks.' In particular Taylor wanted SOE representatives to be based in Portuguese East Africa [Mozambique], an HQ for Todd to be set up in Durban, and permission to operate from Nyasaland, the nearest British colony. In a covering letter enclosed with Taylor's memo, Jebb stressed that `we feel strongly that, in view of the imminence of the Japanese threat, we should make every possible effort to get our organisation in Madagascar fixed up without further delay'.(2)

On 24 December 1941 the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a telegram to the Governor of Nyasaland, asking him to give the Todd Mission any assistance they required. The Governor duly confirmed that he would be glad to see Todd and would give the Mission every facility. On 1 January 1942 the Foreign Office telegraphed the Consuls in Beira and Lourenco Marques informing them that Todd was to appoint three representatives in Mozambique: `Mr. Todd's activities are fully approved by His Majesty's Government and you should afford him and his representatives every assistance, especially as regards bag and cypher facilities and other facilities for communication. He will be instructed to keep you closely informed of his Mission's activities.' Both the Colonial and Foreign Offices had been compelled to climb down a long way from their stance of the autumn.(3)

Platt had less of a readjustment to make, as even before the Chiefs' pronouncement he had begun to see possible advantages in Todd's work. Before he returned to Kenya, Platt told Dalton (as the latter recorded) that `he himself is most anxious to get down to business with Todd and thinks, on the face of it, that the mission may be extremely useful to him'. On 12 December the War Office telegraphed Platt, referring to the Chiefs' decision and requesting `therefore you afford Todd all assistance necessary to enable him to comply and give favourable consideration his views regarding location his HQ which favour Durban'. The Union of South Africa was not part of Platt's Command. Platt had originally wanted Todd in Nairobi under his thumb and it was perhaps to make the change acceptable that Todd came up with the idea that Madagascar should be placed notionally in Platt's Command. This suggestion was eagerly taken up when Todd arrived in Nairobi for discussions which began on Monday 15 December 1941. Platt was away in Abyssinia, but had vested full authority in his Brigadier, who promised that on his return Platt would request the War Office to put Madagascar under his sphere of influence. The Brigadier agreed to the siting of Todd's HQ in Durban on condition that `policy shall be laid down by G.O.C. in C. who will be kept informed mission's activity'. Liaison would be maintained either by the appointment of a member of Todd's Mission as a liaison officer or by using the SIS representative in Nairobi. On Tuesday Todd showed his report to SOE on these arrangements to the Governor of Kenya, who also agreed to them. On Thursday Todd had a confirmatory meeting with Platt who telegraphed details of their understanding to the War Office, stressing that there would be `No SOE activities PEA [Portuguese East Africa] unless authorised by me' and that `Free French to be excluded from all Todd's activities and not to be informed of role or location of Mission ... consider essential on grounds of security'. Platt was no doubt aware that breaches of security by the Free French had preceded the bungled attempt by the British and Free French to occupy Dakar in September 1940. Platt also put pressure on the War Office for the expansion of his Command: `In view ... my relations Todd Mission strongly recommend you include Madagascar in my sphere of influence early as possible informing Union and C. in C. East Indies.' Platt was making use of Todd's new standing for his own purposes and had furthermore driven a hard bargain with Todd in defining the scope of his Mission.(1)

After his meeting with Platt, Todd returned to Durban, where he had begun to build up contacts before his Nairobi trip. On 21 December SOE London wired him a telegram drafted by Hanau expressing their concern at `the dangerously wide measure of control over your mission which appears to be conceded to the G.O.C. in C.'. Todd brushed these doubts manically aside: `Absolutely utterly completely satisfied G.O.C. in C.'s attitude. Has already officially agreed that I have complete freedom of action ... G.O.C. made it clear that he is relying on my organisation for necessary intelligence and pre-operational action and requested me to get in touch with him personally should I come across any difficulty as he stated that he was determined nothing should stand in way of my mission being successfully run.' If Hanau noticed the discrepancy between Platt's belief that he was determining Todd's policy and Todd's belief that he had complete freedom of action, he thought better of pointing it out.(1)

Todd's euphoria may have owed something to the warmth of his reception in the Union by military and government authorities, no doubt a welcome change from the chill of London. When he had first arrived in Durban in November Todd was without cover and had to work from his suite in the Hotel Edward, where the manager obligingly put the entire hotel strong-room at his disposal. The naval authorities were also most helpful, and, as one of Todd's assistants reported to London, `They have granted to the Head of Mission and his officers many facilities which were definitely ultra vires'. Todd's right-hand man was Major Richard Broad MC, a veteran of the Highland Brigade, who had been transferred from SOE's African Section in London to the field. In mid-November Todd and Broad met the Deputy High Commissioner, Price. The latter encouraged them to work from South Africa, but pointed out that if there was any extended work to be done from the Union, the Prime Minister, General Jan Christian Smuts, would have to be consulted. Price felt that Smuts would agree to SOE involvement in Madagascar, as this was merely an extension of what Mayer had been doing, and Smuts was aware of Mayer's work. Emboldened by Price's reaction, the Mission's report to London on this meeting somewhat optimistically claimed that `Pre-supposing that mission successfully launched by New Year satisfied island [Madagascar] can fall like ripe plum by end June 1922 with no effective resistance'.(2)

On 22 December SOE approached the Dominions Office with a request that they instruct the High Commissioner Lord Harlech to make a formal approach to the Union authorities for Todd's HQ to be located in Durban. The Dominions Office wired Harlech on 26 December and after a meeting with Todd the High Commissioner explained the whole matter to Smuts on 30 December. Smuts agreed to Durban, subject to the greatest possible secrecy being maintained. In the light of this Smuts welcomed a helpful suggestion from the British Military Mission to the Union that Todd's party should be attached to Movement Control Durban and be termed Imperial Movement Control (Intelligence Branch). Smuts also agreed that Todd should be put in touch with the Postmaster-General at Cape Town and raised no objection to an SOE officer being stationed at Beira. On 31 December the Head of the Military Mission, Brigadier Salisbury Jones, took Todd to see Smuts and was present at their interview, reporting later to the War Office that Smuts `considers it essential to have early and detailed information regarding Madagascar to enable us to strike in time should occasion demand'. Todd's report to SOE on his interview with the Prime Minister reflected his customary buoyancy: `Had personal interview with General Smuts today who immediately and tremendously enthusiastically approved mission and its objective ... He considers Madagascar terribly important and promised every conceivable facility ... Ground for interview brilliantly prepared by Price ... Salisbury Jones ... could not have been more helpful.' Smuts's enthusiasm for SOE operations in Madagascar may have owed something to the irregular warfare of his youth. It owed more to his appreciation that the Union's territory could not be defended against a Japanese invasion. South Africa's only protection lay in Britain's asserting her grip on the west of the Indian Ocean.(1)

Hugh Dalton, the Minister for SOE, saw Todd's report on his interview with Smuts, underlined the keen adverbs in red and scrawled: `Todd toddles on!' From February 1942 Todd's Mission was installed under cover as the Intelligence Branch of Imperial Movement Control in Tribune House, Durban, the Royal Navy's HQ. SOE had five rent-free offices under military guard. SOE's officers wore uniform and came and went unnoticed. The Union provided the Mission with valuable wireless equipment and exempted it from telegraph and telephone charges. With a little help from the Japanese, Todd's enthusiasm and personal diplomacy had got the field work of the Mission off to a flying start after the long delays in Whitehall. It was with good reason that on 4 February 1942 CD's Deputy wrote to congratulate Todd on his success in obtaining the support of the various local authorities and wished him the best of luck. In February Todd held discussions with the Governor of Nyasaland, who gave him a cordial reception, but, as the Mission reported to London, `It was ... mutually agreed between them that at the present juncture Nyasaland can unfortunately play no serious part in the Mission's activities, more especially as the arrival of even one white man in the protectorate would cause a great deal of comment'.(2)

Having sorted out his relations with the regional authorities, Todd could at last focus on Madagascar. From its base in Durban the Mission organized a vigorous Fifth Column in Madagascar. An SOE memo of 17 April i942 described Mayer as the principal SOE agent there: `He is in direct W/T communication with SOE Durban by means of a secret transmitter and possesses sub-agents at Diego Suarez, Tamatave and Majunga ... During Mayer's absence from Tananarive his wife maintains W/T communications with Durban.' Mayer's effectiveness as an agent was greatly enhanced by his French citizenship. From July 1941 foreigners could only travel from their normal place of residence to another region of Madagascar after applying in advance and giving full details of the travel. The authorities at the destination had to agree to the trip and a written authorization had to be obtained from the home authorities for presentation on arrival in the destination in order to obtain a visa. As a French citizen, Mayer was spared this bureaucracy, which would have seriously impaired his espionage.(1)

Todd also hired further staff in the Union. His idiosyncratic recruitment style was recorded by one of his officers in a memoir. Peter Simpson-Jones had been serving on a cruiser, but was left by his ship at Durban because of a leg injury. Due to his knowledge of French he was drawn into questioning passengers from the captured Vichy convoy. As he recalls, `After a couple of days I noticed that I was being followed by two rather strange individuals unusually dressed for S. Africa in Summer in tweed jackets and plus-fours! ... cornered, they invited me to talk with them ... They told me that they belonged to a very secret outfit ... and ... assured me that I was exactly the man they were looking for. From that moment my life changed completely. Swiftly returned to Durban I was whisked out of the modest naval mess at the Hotel Louis and into the best in town the [Hotel] "Edward" ... Apart from living in luxury and having a big American car I was undergoing intensive training.' Todd and Broad struck the new recruit `as being almost unreal'. The presence of Nazi sympathizers in the South African security apparatus meant that this could not be used to vet locally engaged personnel such as Simpson-Jones, who were screened through consular and naval records and where possible through an independent private channel as well.(2)

While the Missions' major assets were its officers and agents, it also depended heavily on the small ships needed to transport them. It was able to acquire these in part due to the assistance of the South African authorities. The activities of the East African Mission were essentially sea-borne, with aircraft playing a small role. The Mission's most important vessel was a schooner, the Lindi, which operated from Dar-es-Salaam in Tanganyika. Lindi made a series of covert voyages to Madagascar under the codename `Frinton', bearing wireless transmitters and other supplies. Dar-es-Salaam offered better access to north-west Madagascar than Durban, and there was less danger of espionage.(1)

By 18 December 1941 the Chiefs of Staff had approved the capture of Madagascar through a combined operation. Intelligence suggested that the Governor of Madagascar might allow either Germany or Japan to base U-boats on the island. This could be forestalled by the capture of the naval base of Diego Suarez, located in a landlocked bay of the same name which formed one of the finest natural harbours in the world. The idea of a Free French coup had been dropped, and even their participation in the combined operation was ruled out, not least from British misgivings that far from `rallying' Madagascar, the presence of Free French would only inflame resistance, as it had done when the Free French entered Vichy Syria in June 1941. De Gaulle later wrote that `given the traditional impulses of British policy, everything made it imperative for Free France to be present at the operation'. But it was a party to which de Gaulle was not invited. Churchill advised the Chiefs of Staff that `It is of the greatest importance that de Gaulle's people should be misled about IRONCLAD [codename for the Madagascar operation]. Once they know, the secret will be out, as in the case of Dakar.'(2)

General Platt was also left out of `Ironclad'. For the first half of 1942 military developments concerning Madagascar were not included in Platt's Command, but kept under direct War Office control. On 10 March 1942 Platt protested to the War Office that `No reply received to suggestions ... that Madagascar should be placed within my sphere of influence ... Understand operations being planned but unaware by whom or if my troops will be involved ... Todd is under my Command. Questions at issue vitally affect my Command.' The combined operations against Madagascar was in fact to be led by Admiral Syfret as Commander-in-Chief, not by Platt, who had to watch idly while a major operation got under way next door.(3)

SOE had hoped that it could make this operation redundant by deploying the traditional weapons of `perfidious Albion' also favoured by Morton. Diego Suarez was to be bought with gold, not blood. The target of this operation was Capitaine de Corvette Maerten, Naval Officer Commanding Madagascar and Commandant of Diego Suarez, who was an acquaintance of Mayer's. In November 1941 Mayer had reported that Maerten was a mercenary adventurer, who would change sides if the inducement was big enough. He was `completely devoid of any trace of good manners or gentlemanly feelings and is undoubtedly a foul player ... it might be possible to work on him by feminine intrigue, women being his weak point'. Following an enquiry from Todd in early February 1942, Mayer agreed to try to bribe Maerten, despite the risk to his own position. After reporting on the project to Nelson, Hanau told Todd to give the go-ahead. Having sworn Maerten to secrecy, Mayer offered a bribe, only to meet an adamant refusal. Maerten declared he was a staunch supporter of his government and would resist any Japanese action or for that matter any other assault on the naval base, for which they were fully prepared. Although Mayer was a good agent on military matters, he was a poor judge of character. Maerten kept his word not to expose Mayer, who later felt he had achieved something by convincing the Commandant that Britain did not intend military action against Diego Suarez. Mayer claimed that as a result `Ironclad' caught Maerten off his guard. It may be that the metropolitan Vichy authorities did not pass on all their intelligence information to Madagascar, although by the spring of 1942 the Governor-General, Claude Annet, was clearly becoming perturbed at the prospect of outside intervention. In early March he declared publicly that `Madagascar has but one will, to remain French. For this she does not need the aid even temporarily of any other nation ... she will be able to face ... any menace of aggression from whatever source it may come.'(1)

On 15 March 1942 there was a special meeting at the Admiralty to discuss SOE's role in the forthcoming Madagascar operation in more detail. Syfret sent two representatives to the meeting. Major-General R.G. Sturges, who was to command the land force, and his deputy Brigadier Festing both attended in person, a sign of the hopes they pinned on SOE. Each Service presented SOE with its requirements. No doubt mindful of the damage done by the Vichy batteries at Dakar, the Army wanted SOE to cut the telephone lines from the coastal batteries. SOE was to provide guides to conduct the landing parties and `to furnish at least one good English speaking man to be attached to the Brigadier in charge of the landing parties'. Shortly before the zero hour SOE was to provide intelligence from on-shore of `the latest position on the island and the likely kind of reception of the landing parties'. The Navy also wanted intelligence and when the invasion force neared Diego Suarez, SOE was to arrange a light visible for five miles in order to provide a landfall for the ships approaching the beaches.(2)

The convoy for Madagascar left the United Kingdom on 23 March carrying three brigades and a commando. While it was at sea Laval came to power at Vichy and the Chiefs of Staff began to doubt the wisdom of taking provocative action at such a moment. The intelligence available concerning Japanese intentions towards Madagascar was of limited help in reaching a final decision. In particular, the MI6 ISIS] Political Reports since 31 December 1941 offered a kaleidoscope of possibilities, with almost every conceivable scenario of Japanese action or inaction and Vichy response. General Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, opposed the Madagascar operation as late as 24 April, during a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee at which the Prime Minister presided. Brooke argued that we had `little to gain by it', but that the operation might prompt Vichy to invite in the Japanese to Madagascar. Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was at the meeting to support the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, noted in his diary that `as usual, Cs. of S. get cold feet when an operation is ready'. Eden argued against Brooke and in the event Churchill overruled the Chiefs, commenting that `having informed the President and General Smuts that we intended to carry out the operation at an early date, if we now reversed the decision and the Japanese walked into the island, our inaction would take a deal of explaining away'. Churchill also stood firm when a few days later General Sir Archibald Wavell, C-in-C India, exploded over the delay in forces reaching his Command caused by `Ironclad'. Wavell telegraphed the War Office that the proposed reduction in his forces was `sheer madness' and commented that `Unless War Cabinet considers "Ironclad" of greater strategical importance than Ceylon they are taking very grave risks indeed in diverting so large proportion of meagre resources in East to it'.(1)

On 1 March 1942 German Military Intelligence had predicted that the British might seize Madagascar and by the second half of April it was obvious to friend and foe alike that Britain was planning a major operation in the Indian Ocean. Force 121 assembled in Durban with more than twenty warships, including the battleship Ramillies. Todd's status was such that he was invited to dinner with Admiral Syfret and took part in an ensuing conference of British and South African military leaders. He reported to London that `both the military and political aspects of Ironclad were discussed with the Prime Minister [Smuts] at great length ... it fell upon me to provide most of the information required ... The Prime Minister appeared to show what I would describe as slightly indignant surprise that HMG had not consulted him about the strategic plan to be employed by the Military ... He expressed some disapproval of the fact that the operation was being confined to Diego Suarez ... He appeared to be particularly anxious for information with regard to the future policy of HMG in Madagascar, but of course on this matter no one was able to enlighten him'. Smuts argued for the capture of two further ports in Madagascar, Tamatave and Majunga, in addition to Diego Suarez, and announced that he would inform London of his views the following day.(1)

Hanau had travelled out from London to take part in the SOE operations and he wired London for clarification of Britain's intentions towards Madagascar. Brien Clarke passed on the telegram to Desmond Morton, who drafted a reply. This was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, via General Ismay, before Clarke sent it to Hanau on 1 May. The message told Hanau that `You should after it is known that the operation has begun make it clear to [Mayer] and his friends that the island will remain French'.(2) By 21 April 1942 Mayer had provided SOE with very detailed intelligence on the military and political situation in Madagascar. On 25 April he travelled to Diego Suarez to gather current intelligence on the defences. On 29 April Mayer kept a rendezvous to pass on the material with a party landed from the Lindi which then had to re-embark for security reasons. Mayer's intelligence included particulars of the ships in Diego Suarez harbour, wireless stations, troop strengths and location of bridges. Meanwhile back in Tananarive Madame Mayer sent daily wireless reports to Admiral Syfret, who later commented in his report on the operation that `During the passage a number of Intelligence reports were received from Agents of the Todd Mission ... some of these Intelligence reports proved to be most valuable'. Of particular importance was a message from Lindi passed on to the invasion fleet to the effect that the island of Nossi-Anambo was one and three-quarter miles further west than charted. False bearings from the island could have dislocated the Fleet's approach to Madagascar.(3)

While the East African Mission was beginning its acid test, SOE's top leadership had been replaced. In February 1942 Lord Selborne succeeded Dalton as Minister for Economic Warfare with responsibility for SOE. Selborne realized that Nelson was exhausted and replaced him as CD in April 1942 with Sir Charles Hambro, previously Nelson's deputy. Hambro had taken an interest in Madagascar from an early stage, predicting in May 1941 that `with resolute action either from without or within this important fruit would be ours'. But Hambro felt that another early supporter of the East African Mission, Gladwyn Jebb, had overstayed his welcome in SOE. Dalton claimed that Hambro could never forget that Jebb had been his fag at Eton. By the beginning of May it was known that Jebb was leaving. On his return to the Foreign Office Jebb asked to be posted to Madagascar. This suggestion was firmly rejected and he was sent to the Treasury for a period of re-education. (1)

The personnel changes at the top gave an added significance to SOE's role in `Ironclad', as one of the first operations with the new team in charge. On 4 May Hambro received an obsequious telegram from the East African Mission: `All at Headquarters [in Durban] express to you their devotion and loyalty and that Ironclad may be the first star in what we all feel is assured to be a glittering firmament.' The next day Todd wired that the Lindi, with which he was in wireless contact, had displayed the requisite light and given the fleet landfall. The fleet could now land a force in Ambararata and Courrier Bays which would take Diego Suarez from the rear. During the night of the landing, Percy Mayer cut the telephone line from Diego Suarez to the artillery battery which dominated the landing beaches in Courrier Bay. As 5 Commando and part of the 2nd East Lancashires were landed the battery failed to open fire. The machine-gun post which commanded the landing place was successfully stormed from the rear in accordance with a suggestion originating with Mayer, who had previously reconnoitred the post. During the invasion Hanau and Broad were attached to Brigadier Festing. Broad carried out reconnaissance and observation work for Festing and Hanau acted as an interpreter, interrogating prisoners of war and, as he reported on 12 May, `arranged by verbal negotiation capitulation of troops still resisting at Bellevue and heavy batteries on Orange Peninsula' (which commanded the entrance to Diego Suarez Bay). An SOE wireless transmitter manned by Legg under sniper fire was initially the only link between the area of operations and the outside world. Hanau concluded a breathless report: `Naval and Military Commanders have expressed to me in no measured terms their appreciation SOE's part in Ironclad ... All our chaps did well and our task was made easy by good organization of SOE [and its] splendid and flawless pre-occupational work.' The new leadership in London must have been delighted with such an early success to report and on 14 May SOE London wired back: `Best congratulations from all here on a grand job well planned organised and carried out and which already has greatly redounded to the credit of SOE and given us strong backing in high quarters for our claim to damage the enemy wherever and whenever we can get at him.' Selborne felt that SOE had done `a splendid job'. On 22 June Todd reported that `when I saw General Sturges at Pretoria on Saturday he greeted me by mentioning that the cutting of the communications by Mayer on the night of the operation was the finest bit of Fifth Column work he had heard of'.(1)

Selborne was determined that Churchill should be made aware of SOE's achievements. On 14 July 1942 he wrote to the Prime Minister that `As my Department works more in the twilight than in the limelight, I should like to keep you informed regularly of the progress of the brave men who serve in it. I therefore attach a short report of the work accomplished in the four months since I took office.' The first detailed item in Selborne's report was a paragraph on SOE's `important part' in `Ironclad'. Unfortunately Churchill does not seem to have had the time to read the report and asked for it to be epitomized. But even the summary for the Prime Minister stressed the importance of SOE's role in Madagascar: `The achievements of SOE in Norway, the Balkans and Madagascar are very impressive.'(2)

SOE's role in Madagascar is omitted from the official History of the War Against Japan, which devotes a chapter to British military operations on the island. The discussion of events in Courrier Bay verges on the ludicrous: `All waited for the batteries ashore to open fire but, to the great surprise of everyone, the quiet of the summer night was undisturbed.' Captain S. W. Roskill gives a similar version in The War At Sea, adding the implausible suggestion that the defenders slept through the approach of the British ships even though minesweepers detonated several mines. Even an account published by the Ministry of Defence in 1995, the year following the release of the SOE files in question, quite ignores Mayer's role.(3)

The day after the landings Mayer, who was still working behind Vichy lines, was informed on by an old friend and arrested. As he was carrying his most recent intelligence notes, he was sentenced to death for espionage. Fortunately Mayer was freed by the rapid advance of the British troops which he had made possible, and he was able to act as an adviser to the attacking forces. The Vichy Military Commander of Diego Suarez surrendered on 8 May. Over a hundred British lives had been lost in the fighting. But for SOE, it seems likely this figure would have been considerably higher. The two outstanding successes were Mayer and Legg. Todd recommended to London that Mayer should be permitted to resume his British citizenship and become `a regular Officer of the Mission' (i.e. full-time and salaried) with the rank of Major. Similarly he recommended that Legg should be appointed a full Officer of the Mission and be commissioned a Captain. Todd's recommendations with regard to Mayer and Legg were all accepted and Legg was further awarded the MC. SOE's success was also reflected in its treatment by the GOC Diego Suarez, General Sturges, who gave the Mission a house, whatever small arms they wanted, and 50,000 francs.(1)

`Ironclad' had been a notable success. Britain had shown the same ruthless enterprise in seizing the strategic initiative which Germany and Japan had displayed on so many occasions. Admiral Fricke, of the High Command of the German Navy, believed that `the focal point of the entire war lies today in the western Indian Ocean, as the crushing of the British position in the Near East and the establishment of direct contact with Japan will decide the war'. The Japanese Mission to take Diego Suarez was indeed to prove a turning-point in the war. With Diego Suarez in their hands, the Japanese would have split the British Empire in two. Even the mere presence of large Japanese naval forces in the west of the Indian Ocean would have put Britain's communications under intolerable strain and raised the spectre of a disaster in the Middle East even greater than that in South-East Asia. Now the opportunity had passed. Churchill had certainly predicted the best strategic move for Japan. On 10 May, in a world broadcast he commented with unfeigned relief on the seizure of Diego Suarez: `While the troops were on the sea, I must tell you I felt a shiver every time I saw the word "Madagascar" in the newspapers.' Churchill nevertheless decided that the occupation of Diego Suarez would have to suffice for the present, as the halting of operations freed troops to satisfy General Wavell's insistent demands for reinforcements.(2)

Some historians who mention Madagascar imply that `Ironclad', and by extension the SOE operations in support of it, were pointless, as the Japanese never intended to occupy Madagascar anyway. General Kirby writes that `The occupation of Madagascar was never considered by the Japanese'. J. R. M. Butler asks `Was Ironclad necessary?' and states that `the Japanese had no intention of using Diego Suarez themselves'. Neither authority provides a source reference for his certainty, and the German documents suggest that the Japanese were at least considering a landing on Madagascar. On 20 February 1942 General Eugen Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, reported that the Japanese Navy was seriously considering taking over Madagascar. On 12 March 1942 the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Raeder, reported to Hitler that `The Japanese have recognised the great strategic importance of Madagascar ... they are planning to establish bases on Madagascar.' Hitler's only comment was that the French would not agree to such bases. Under pressure from the Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim yon Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador Oshima Hiroshi promised to obtain clarification of his government's intentions with regard to Madagascar, but no direct answer seems to have been forthcoming. Oshima's query was intercepted and decoded by the Americans, and President Roosevelt asked that Churchill's attention should be drawn to the fact that the Germans were encouraging the Japanese to land on Madagascar. The gist of Oshima's message was circulated in Whitehall as BJ No. 102443: `RIBBENTROP enquired whether Japan did not consider it necessary to occupy MADAGASCAR as a base. Japanese ambassador stated he did not know. Ribbentrop said GERMANY would back JAPAN if she wanted to act. He thought JAPAN should present a fait accompli.' This account of the conversation tallies with the version Ribbentrop sent to Ott, though Ribbentrop put it less bluntly.(1)

While the primary effect of this German pressure on Japan was to spur on Churchill, it also led to a Japanese promise of action against Madagascar. At a meeting on 8 April the Japanese Naval Attache, Admiral Nomura, told Admiral Fricke that although the date for possible Japanese operations against Ceylon or Madagascar was not fixed, they would be attacked if Axis strategy required it. Ambassador Ott later reported from Tokyo that during March and April the Japanese Navy had been studying the feasibility of a landing on Madagascar, but the project had been postponed due to a lack of forces. When the German Navy heard that the British, and not the Japanese, had landed in Madagascar, there was a bitter entry in its War Diary: `This enemy attack is no surprise to the High Command. It had been on the cards for a long time.' On 13 May Fricke pointed out to Nomura that the British landing on Madagascar had brought their enemy a substantial improvement in its ability to protect the key sea-routes. But, Fricke claimed, `for the time being the English position on Madagascar is extremely weak. This offers favourable prospects of success for a Japanese counter-measure.'(2)

The Japanese had to do something substantial to appease the Germans. The big British ships nicely lined up at Diego Suarez were the answer. The Royal Navy believed it was safe from attack. But Diego Suarez proved just as vulnerable to submarines as Scapa Flow, to which it was compared. The Japanese attack on Diego Suarez was launched at the end of May by the 1st Division of the 8th Submarine Flotilla under the command of Admiral Ishizaki, whose force included midget submarines. The midgets successfully torpedoed Ramillies and a tanker. Ramillies's fifteen-inch guns were no defence against a two-man submarine. The battleship was seriously damaged and eventually had to return to Britain.(1)

Smuts had been worrying about a Japanese threat to East Africa since 1934. Now his fears were being realized, and the British grip on Madagascar was still uncertain. At the end of May Smuts contacted Churchill and overcame his reluctance to sanction further operations in Madagascar. Smuts also maintained his close links with SOE. On 3 June 1942 he visited Durban to inspect defences and confer with officers. He summoned Mayer and Todd for a private conference and, as Todd reported, `stated he had expressed to HMG very strongly views similar to our 0522 [a cable dated 20 May pressing for the complete occupation of Madagascar]'. At a public meeting in the evening Smuts announced the formation of two new divisions, and, as he wrote to a confidant, other measures intended `to meet the menace of Japan in the Indian ocean. That menace is very real ... I would rather be under the superior English than the slave-driving Jap.' Ishizaki now divided his forces into two groups and attacked merchant ships at both ends of the Mozambique Channel. By the time his group withdrew to its base in Penang in July, it had crippled a battleship and destroyed over 120,000 tons of merchant shipping for the loss of two midget submarines. Ishizaki's offensive suggested that the possession of Diego Suarez alone was not enough. Britain needed control of the whole of Madagascar to gain the bases to patrol the Mozambique Channel effectively.(2)

The efforts to consolidate Britain's position on Madagascar got under way at a time when SOE's co-operation with the army seemed to be going from strength to strength. On 30 June 1942 control of Force 121 in Madagascar finally passed to the East African Command of General Platt. This was the reorganization first proposed by Todd the previous year and taken up with alacrity by the General himself. It seemed to augur even closer and more effective SOE/army co-ordination. Todd's comment was that `in view of cordial relations already established nothing could suit us better'. When in early July 1942 SOE sought approval for a new Directive for its work in Madagascar, it was informed that the Chiefs' Directors of Plans `have concluded that it would be best for instructions to be issued by the Commander-in-Chief, East Africa, who is in the best position to know what is required at any particular time ... you should advise your representative to get in touch with General Platt and to enquire from him the general direction which he wishes your activities to follow'. Platt now had so much formal control over SOE's Madagascar activities that Todd was little more than a recipient of orders.(1)

The ideal solution for Britain was to gain the key strategic places in the rest of Madagascar without further fighting. An Allied propaganda film later depicted a Petainist Chief of Police who, on hearing of the landings at Diego Suarez, put away his bottle of vichy water and took out a whisky and soda and a picture of Queen Victoria. In reality the Vichy elite on the island proved more resolute. The British hoped to win over Governor-General Annet and to this end unofficial messengers, including one of Todd's men, peddled up and down between Diego Suarez and Tananarive. Annet staged a charade of negotiations in order to play for time. SOE's intelligence from Madagascar provided the useful service of making it perfectly clear, as Todd put it in a telegram of July 16, that Annet `is not sincere and working to gain time and extra Army facilities for provisioning Madagascar and Reunion ... all our internal Intelligence goes to show that ANNET negotiations have little or no chance of success and it is quite clear that their military strength is steadily increasing and their organisation improving.'(2)

Annet's delaying tactics were intended to avert further British operations until the onset of the rainy season in October made them impossible. In the event this time factor would put Platt under considerable pressure, though the delay in getting started owed more to other theatres taking priority than to Annet. Platt's strategy for the capture of the rest of Madagascar envisaged a sea-borne landing at Majunga on the west coast followed by a march on the capital Tananarive, supplemented by a further sea-borne landing at Tamatave on the east coast. These operations eventually received the names of `Stream', `Line' and `Jane' respectively. `Line' was problematical, as its route of march passed across large rivers. Two bridges in particular had to be captured intact if the British were to reach Tananarive before the rains. At the end of July Platt asked for paratroops to be made available to secure the bridges. But the Chiefs of Staff told Platt that they regretted no paratroops were available. Nevertheless on 3 August the Chiefs authorized `further operations to clear up the situation in Madagascar ... forthwith'. But the same afternoon the Chiefs began to have doubts and they telegraphed East Africa Command that `it would be extremely dangerous to fail or even only partially succeed as we would then be in worse case than at present ... since we are now working upon such a narrow margin of time before incidence of rains, we now request your frank and considered opinion as to prospects of success.' The Chiefs were putting Platt under great pressure. He replied laconically that 'am confident we shall have no difficulty in taking Majunga ... The risks are the bridges and the difficulty of landing at Tamatave. The advantages of success however are so great that I consider we would be justified in running the risks.' On 12 August Platt telegraphed the War Office that `with such a very short margin of time before rains when the rivers come down in real spate the securing of [Betsiboka] bridge intact is vital to advance on Tananarive. No (rept. no) chance must be taken of its being destroyed.' Platt was staking his reputation on the bridge at Betsiboka.(1)

SOE had rendered great service in the capture of Diego Suarez. But this operation had fatally weakened its organization in Madagascar. In particular its key agent, Percy Mayer, had been blown and his assistants compromised. On 25 June Todd reported to London that `the capture of Mayer with incriminating documents upon him rendered the position of the other members of his organisation in the island extremely precarious ... Madame Mayer, Richard Mayer [Mayer's brother], and Gordge [a British national recruited by Mayer] have had their homes searched and also are under close police surveillance, and Richard Mayer has been instructed to close his house, which was some miles outside Majunga, and to come and live in the town so that he may be more easily watched. Naturally enough all British subjects in the unoccupied portion of the island are now subject to the closest scrutiny, and this, of course, has resulted in further problems for us.' Todd's organization was impaired, but the lull in the fighting throughout the summer of 1942 provided him with every opportunity to make good its defects. William Strang of the Foreign Office rightly advised SOE to develop its organization on the rest of the island as much as possible. In particular Todd needed to find someone to take Mayer's place as the main agent behind enemy lines. Todd decided to send Richard Broad. Broad travelled under cover as assistant to an executive of an American oil company who was making a tour of inspection to Tananarive. For the sake of his cover, Broad adopted a loud Hollywood accent. Todd reported that Broad `has been instructed to remain in enemy occupied territory until after the forthcoming operations, so that he may be able to take personal charge of the arrangements to carry out the task allotted to the Mission by Platt'. For all his political skills, Broad lacked Mayer's local knowledge and indeed his solidity. The two were on poor terms, not the best of situations with Broad taking over an organization whose most effective members belonged to Mayer's family. There were other indications of trouble to come. Todd himself was showing a lack of judgement. On 2 August he telegraphed London to ask for a ruling on whether `when travelling in Madagascar if we come across any bitter and aggressive French men known to be doing harm to the Allied cause should they be destroyed or captured.' Hanau, by now back in London, replied the next day `Do not repeat not ask us awkward questions [sic] ... We dislike the idea of having bodies in captivity which might cause the Prime Minister or us embarrassment. Whatever you do execute the job neatly and avert suspicion.' Perhaps the most worrying development for SOE was that Todd's relations with General Platt were beginning to turn sour, as the General felt the War Office was turning SOE into a loose cannon. Platt wanted SOE to prevent destruction, particularly of bridges and wireless stations. But at the same time the War Office was telling Todd that the destruction of the Tamatave wireless station was the highest priority. On 10 August Platt complained to the War Office that `I strongly object to Todd receiving instructions regarding operations for which I am responsible without my being consulted or even informed about them. Request you stop any repetition of this procedure.' From the file it appears that Platt only had to raise this matter once.(1)

By the end of August SOE's participation in the second phase of Madagascar operations had been finalized along the following lines. It was to provide regular and particularly last-minute intelligence, liaison officers and French-speaking guides, and was furthermore to mount a series of operations. On D minus one an SOE vessel, the Frontier, would land a first party on Madagascar which was to destroy mobile wireless cars before moving to prevent the destruction of the bridges over the Kamoro and Betsiboka. Todd instructed Broad to be present at the Betsiboka Bridge and to deal with the European officer there on the night of the operation. As the fleet approached Majunga the Frontier would buoy a key reef. SOE was also to organize the cutting of telegraph (and telephone) wires at pre-arranged times. This would prevent the passing of instructions to blow the bridges. Even before Todd had reported his complete list of commitments, Hanau had wired him that `Assignment seems ambitious but if you can cope it will be admirable achievement and real contribution to operation.' In the event Hanau's doubts were to be all too fully vindicated. Todd's concession of a wide measure of control to Platt the previous December made it hard for SOE to reject or modify over-ambitious assignments.(2)

SOE's participation in the second phase of the Madagascar operations began badly. The landing of agents from the Frontier on the day before the British invasion went disastrously wrong. As Hanau summarized it, `One party was successfully landed, but before the remainder could go ashore and Frontier could put to sea, a French patrol launch appeared and hailed the vessel. Frontier made off at once but obviously French suspicions were aroused, and the party lying in concealment in the bush were hunted down and captured.' On 26 August Platt had wired the War Office that `I am particularly anxious not to give any warning to enemy'. Now SOE had blown the gaffe. Nevertheless, the Frontier successfully buoyed a reef off the north-west coast of Madagascar for the guidance of the invasion fleet, and Madame Mayer transmitted a detailed report on the approaches, defences and troop dispositions at Majunga.(1)

Although the capture of the Frontier party had put the military authorities in Majunga on their guard, an infantry brigade landed successfully on 10 September, encountering only slight opposition. Thanks to SOE, the head of the radio station in Majunga was persuaded to keep the installation intact. Majunga surrendered within hours, and British armoured cars hurried down the Tananarive Road towards the key bridges. At four o'clock in the afternoon they seized intact the bridge over the Kamoro River. But they were unable to reach the Betsiboka Bridge the same day. This bridge was the object of General Platt's obsessive concern. SOE had two plans to prevent its demolition. The first was to use agents from the Frontier, but these of course had been captured. The second plan was for Broad to drive up from Tananarive, stage a breakdown of his car near the bridge, spend the night with the troops guarding it, and somehow prevent its destruction. Thus Platt's key concern was addressed with a woolly project which it seems that Broad never even tried to implement. Furthermore, Broad's agents also failed to cut the wires linking Betsiboka Bridge with Tananarive because they were told an incorrect date for the landing. When the leading elements of the forward party reached Betsiboka Bridge in the early hours of 11 September they found all four cables of the suspension span had been cut. The previous day the French guards, had been given orders to blow the bridge on the approach of British troops, or when darkness fell. So it had been blown at six o'clock the previous evening. In his account of the operations the troops' field commander, General Dimoline, noted bitterly that `Had the telephone links been cut its destruction would have been spared. But the promised agents who were to carry out this task proved to be little more than a myth.'(1)

Platt had entrusted SOE with a series of key tasks and they had been found wanting. On Ii September Todd reported to London that `Platt who is in Majunga personally enquired circumstances of our failure. Fear he takes poor of view of matter and there may be serious repercussion.' The same day he sent a personal telegram to Hanau: `Please express to CD my deep regret at our failure.' Hambro's immediate reaction to SOE's performance was that Todd 'has made a proper mess of it'. In fact things were not quite as bad as they seemed. The span of the Betsiboka Bridge had fallen on the river bed in one piece. As the water was shallow before the rains, infantry could cross on foot and vehicles could be winched across. The British advance continued with only slight delay, and SOE was able to provide intelligence on road blocks and the situation in the capital Tananarive, where SOE sabotaged the power station, causing considerable disruption. Tananarive surrendered on 23 September. But Platt was not a forgiving man. As soon as the campaign was over he recommended that all SOE personnel be withdrawn from Madagascar. On 5 October 1942 Platt telegraphed the War Office that 'I consider continued presence in island of SOE organisation is unnecessary and calculated to lead to trouble ... [Mayer] having worn French uniform and having been French citizen now appears as Major in British army ... He should leave here soonest. `But Platt's fiercest resentment was reserved for Broad who had failed him at the key bridge. Platt detested Broad so much that his invective became a staccato lyric. In the same telegram he noted: `Broad of SOE wearing dark glasses gold teeth an American accent and a Highland Brigade tie in amateur fashion typical of his kind has informed me that Todd has returned to England and that Broad is being promoted to replace Todd ... Is it true?' While it was true that Todd was on his way back to Britain, this telegram did not help Broad's hopes of replacing him, though he headed the Mission on a caretaker basis. Broad remained convinced that his personal charm could win back Platt's favour. On 15 October he wired London 'Believe it essential in view of the fact Platt most temperamental we must maintain very closest possible contact and liaison with him. Was therefore proposing at very first opportunity to visit him ... Believe this would be good move.' The absence of a record suggests no such meeting took place, and it may be that London, fearing for Broad's safety, warned him not to go. SOE's cavalier use of uniform seems to have upset Platt just as much as their operational flops. When in December 1942 he needed help to secure vital bridges in French Somaliland, he turned to the Free French, not SOE. (1)

Some of the abuse Platt hurled at Todd's Mission made an impression. On 5 November 1942 a senior SOE official told the Acting Head of the Africa Section, Major Sheridan, that `possibly SOE had made rather a mess of Madagascar, otherwise the G.O.C.-in-C. would not have demanded the withdrawal of all our people'. It was clear Todd had become a liability as head of the East African Mission. Even before the September failures Hanau had by implication proposed his removal. He reported to London that Todd 'has done magnificent work in establishing his Mission on a very firm basis in the difficult atmosphere of the Union ... No one could be better at establishing a new enterprise in difficult circumstances. I do not feel, however, that he can settle down to consolidate.' Broad was also seen as a liability. On 9 December 1942 the head of the African Section noted: `We have not been at all satisfied with Broad's conduct of the affairs of the Mission since he has been acting Head, and his letters, reports and telegrams imply to us that he is a somewhat irresponsible man.' As Todd's permanent successor, Hambro chose Major A. W. Smith, a businessman who had previously served in the War Office. On 16 December Hambro directed Smith to proceed to Durban as quickly as possible: `You will take the first opportunity of making contact with the G.O.C. in C. East Africa.'(2)

The full force of Platt's almost abnormal hatred for SOE was unleashed on Smith when he called on the General in Nairobi on 15 April 1943. Smith had intended to pay his respects, investigate the prospects for further SOE work in Platt's Command, and secure a recommendation from the General of a decoration for Broad for his work in Madagascar. He wired to London that Platt had 'made it offensively clear that as far as he was concerned SOE stinks'. He reported by bag in more detail that 'I found the G.O.C. in C. aggressively, not to say offensively, hostile to SOE in general and in particular to the individuals who have served in this Mission. He opened our conversation by saying that he "could not think" what I had come for and that in his opinion SOE was "utterly useless" and "a complete waste of time."... the G.O.C. in C. then levelled certain specific accusations against [Todd] and [Broad] involving bad faith, inefficiency and disobedience ... He then ordered me to see that Broad was never employed again by SOE in any capacity (He used the phrase "You will make sure that ...")'. Under the circumstances Smith decided it was not the right moment to raise the matter of Broad's medal.(1)

Mayer had achieved more than Broad, but his decoration also proved problematical. On 19 May 1943 Hambro wrote to the King's Private Secretary Sir Alexander Hardinge about Mayer, who was visiting Britain: `Major Mayer is a French subject ... [who] has been awarded the CBE and his wife the MBE for the services they have rendered and I am wondering whether it would be possible for His Majesty to receive Mayer personally and present him with his and his wife's decoration.' Hardinge replied on 20 May that 'the difficulty is that there are so many of these foreign subjects who have performed wonderful acts of bravery, and it would really be impossible for the King to start decorating them all personally. It is as much as he can do to get through the investiture of his own subjects. I feel sure you will agree that it would be very invidious to pick out any one of these foreigners for this particular honour.' Hambro pressed his point and wrote to Hardinge with a correction on 23 May to the effect that `Mayer is not a Frenchman, but is a british [sic] subject who would in normal circumstances receive his decoration from the King at an investiture in the ordinary way. The only reason why he cannot do so is that [it] is judged unsafe on security grounds.' Hardinge replied that the King would be pleased to receive Mayer and the matter would be kept completely secret.(2)

Mayer's decoration was earned through exceptional flair and courage. Moreover, the risks he took did serve a useful purpose. The occupation of Madagascar not only improved the Allies' naval communications, it also made available vital raw materials, in particular the highest grades of amber mica used for the sparking plugs in aero-engines. Furthermore, the island made a considerable contribution to Allied graphite supplies, used in a wide range of war industries. The claims that `Ironclad' was unnecessary and by extension SOE's contribution pointless are without foundation. The seizure of bases on Madagascar was the optimum strategic move for Japan and a landing was considered. So SOE's operational and intelligence role was not irrelevant. Mayer and his associates were the core of SOE's East African Mission, providing essential intelligence throughout the Madagascar campaigns of 1942. This intelligence, and the tactical operations of SOE during the first Madagascar campaign, provided a valuable contribution to the war effort, and were acknowledged as such by the British military leaders, Platt excepted. Certainly SOE's relations with the GOC-in-C left something to be desired. Perhaps over-conscious of the need to prove itself as an organization, SOE was too eager to please and for 'Stream', `Line' and `Jane' bit off far more than it could chew at a time when its local organization was impaired. SOE's performance in the second phase of Madagascar operations was, as Selborne put it, a `curate's egg'. But Platt's determination to control SOE was partly to blame for the failures. Together the General and the Chiefs of Staff had put Todd in a position where he was so much under Platt's thumb that it was hard for him to refuse unrealistic tasks. Platt's courage and military competence brought about the success of the second Madagascar campaign, but the strain led him to demonize the organization which let him down.(1)

SOE's enemies in Whitehall outnumbered the paper clips, and David Stafford is surely right that it survived only due to Churchill's support. But Stafford overstates Morton's hostility to SOE. Like SOE itself, Desmond Morton's role was a wartime mushroom. He too was willing to contemplate unconventional methods. Stafford sees him as critical, prejudiced and sceptical with regard to SOE, citing, for example, Morton's comment to Churchill of 6 January 1944 that `I have always held the view that ... at least part of the work for which SOE is now responsible should always have been carried out by "C"'.(2) But Morton was inconsistent. He had allowed Mayer to be passed on to in late 1940 after Mayer had volunteered to provide intelligence, at first sight a matter for SIS to supervise. Furthermore, on occasion Morton was willing to stick his neck out to save SOE embarrassment before his Committee. In late 1942 SOE decided it needed to trade with Madagascar as cover for its operations in Mozambique. Unfortunately Hanau had already promised the Morton Committee not to use such cover. Morton took the decision to sanction this on himself and did not make SOE bring it before the Committee, sparing their blushes. The evidence of the East African files show that Morton stimulated and encouraged the development of SOE's activities in Madagascar. On 13 May 1942 a senior SOE figure wrote to Morton `to confirm that we are quite happy that you know sufficient about SOE possibilities not to miss opportunities of bringing us in where we can be helpful.' SOE's East African Mission was also welcomed by the War Office. On 4 December 1941 Taylor referred to `friendly interest which the War Office have taken in the Mission,' though this would later wane as Platt's animosity grew.(3)

With the notable exception of Platt, in general SOE's East African Mission seems to have achieved good relations with the regional potentates. Price, Deputy High Commissioner in the Union until the autumn of 1942, took a very great interest in Todd's Mission, and prepared the way for its favourable reception by Harlech and Smuts. As Broad reported to London in November 1942 in a telegram passed to Hambro, a close personal relationship had always existed between Harlech and `both Todd and myself ... He is and has been good friend to us though is not in my opinion terribly discreet.' Smuts's positive attitude was crucial. Todd felt that Smuts 'regards the mission as almost a department of his own working for him as much as for [the] British Government'. Smuts's approval was even of value as a weapon in Whitehall wars. In February 1943 Selborne told Hambro that 'I want to make use of Smuts as an advocate with other departments. He carries great guns here especially with the P.M. and I think we may have less trouble this way than we normally find.' Smuts's support was also of decisive local importance, as he set the tone for the other senior figures in the Union who were 'in the know', both ministers and senior civil servants. Smuts's right-hand man was a senior civil servant, Forsyth, who smoothed SOE's path in the Union, though Smith was to conclude that `Mr. Forsyth takes the usual Civil Servant's point of view that although he is prepared to assist us and M15 up to a point, that point does not go very far.' Brigadier Lenton, the Postmaster-General in the Union, was more willing to stretch a point, particularly in the provision of wireless equipment. In December 1942 Hambro asked Selborne to write to Deputy-Prime Minister Attlee `with the request that he should ask Lord Harlech ... to thank Brigadier Lenton ... for the great interest and assistance that he gave and is still giving to the Todd Mission in South Africa'. The regional authorities in Mauritius also helped SOE. Successive Governors, Sir Bede Clifford and Sir D. Mackenzie King, were regarded by SOE's African Section as `extremely helpful', as was the key administrator, Twining, who held the post of Chief Censor.(1)

Todd and Broad did well to establish smooth relations between SOE and the South African authorities. But Todd lacked the realism to run operations, and Broad was dashing but sloppy. With Mayer sidelined after May i942, Todd and Broad dominated the second phase of SOE operations on Madagascar, and these proved partly a fiasco. A striking characteristic of SOE's work in Madagascar is that although the Mission deployed more than twenty officers its impact depended largely on the efforts of perhaps a third of this number. While the going was good, the rest of the Mission for the most part flew along on the coat tails of a few energetic officers. The extreme variations in the quality of SOE personnel may partly explain the discrepancies in reactions to its work both at the time and since.

(*) I would like to thank the Nuffield and Scouloudi Foundations and the European Studies Research Institute of the University of Salford for generous financial support. Mr Peter Simpson-Jones, CBE, of SOE's East African Mission, and one of its most energetic officers, very kindly gave me permission to use and quote from his memoir. `The Lighter Side of Spying', a tape and transcript of which are to be found in the Imperial War Museum. I would like to thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London for permission to quote from General Dimoline. The Foreign Office SOE Adviser, Mr Duncan Stuart, CMG, helped with the provision of evidence. Richard J. Aldrich, Martin S. Alexander, Erik Goldstein, Geoff Harris and John W. Young gave invaluable assistance. I gave a paper on SOE in Southern Africa to the Annual Conference of the British International History Group at the University of Ulster/Coleraine in September 1997, and benefited greatly from the helpful comments of the audience. SOE's records make extensive use of pseudonyms and symbols, which I have replaced in the text with the name of the person involved without further ado. I have retained the original symbols in the footnote references.

(1.) M. R. D. Foot, SOE. The Special Operations Executive, 1940-46 (London, 1984), p. 250; John Keegan, The Second World War (London, 1989), p. 495. A recent article by Martin Thomas has been an invaluable guide to archival sources on Madagascar, `Imperial Backwater or Strategic Outpost? The British Takeover of Vichy Madagascar, 1942', Historical Journal, xxxix (1996), 1049-74.

(1.) David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents (London, 1983), pp. 56-7, 209; Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London, 1985), pp. 476-7; P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], HS 3/7, Note by Dalton on memo from AD to CEO, 23 Nov. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/12, AD4 to AD/U, 11 Nov. 1942; HS 3/9, UK High Commissioner South Africa to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 22 Nov. 1940, Cadett to Jebb, 25 Nov. 1940, S.O.2 Madagascar no.F.5., 31 Jan. 1941, extract from Wedlake's Terms of Reference, l0 Feb. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/9, Wedlake's despatch of 21 Mar. 1941, minute from Hanau to Broad, 1 Apr. 1941; HS 3/14, `An Account of SOE Operations in Africa', pp. 4-5; HS 3/11, AD/W to DEO, 29 Oct. 1941; HS 3/7, Governor (Sir B. Clifford) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 Sept. 1941; F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (5 vols., London, 1979-90) ii.7; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of Worm War Two (Cambridge, 1994), p. 160; Michael Salewski, Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935-1945 (3 vols., Frankfurt am Main/Munich, 1970-75), ii. 153; Martin Thomas, `The Massingham Mission. SOE in French North Africa, 1941-1944', Intelligence and National Security, xi, 697.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/9, Jebb to Morton, 28 May 1941, Morton's reply, 30 May 1941.

(1.) Julian Amery, Approach March: A Venture in Autobiography (London, 1973), pp. 160, 223; id., Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla War (London, 1948), p. 26; PRO, HS 3/9, PS by Hanau on memo from Philip Broad to CD, 31 May 1941, telegram from Hanau to S.O. (I) Cape Town, 4 June 1941; John Harvey (ed.), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London, 1978), p. 166, entry for 2 Oct. 1942; HS 3/l0, CD to X, 16 June 1941.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/8, Caesar to AD/W, 3 Feb. 1942; HS 3/9, S.O.2 to Mr Brittain, 11 Aug. 1941; HS 3/14, Internal SOE memorandum of Feb. 1942; Information from SOE Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; HS 3/11, Caesar to AD/W, 2 Sept. 1941.

(1.) Foot, SOE, p. 187; PRO, HS 3/8, Caesar to AD/W, 3 Feb. 1942; HS 3/7, GOC in C East Africa Command to War Office, 18 Sept. 1941.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/14, Moyne to Dalton, 24 Sept. 1941; HS 3/11, Eden to Moyne, 10 Oct. 1941.

(3.) PRO, HS 3/11, Caesar to AD/A through AD/W, 10 Oct. 1941, AD/A to AD/W, 15 Oct. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/11, Dalton to Moyne, 20 Oct. 1941.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/7, `Notes of a Meeting held at the Dominions Office', 29 Nov. 1941, Dalton to Moyne, 3 Nov. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14, `An Account of SOE Operations in Africa', p. 4; HS 3/28, John H. Godfrey to Wing Commander Sir Frank Nelson, 13 Nov. 1941; L. C. F. Turner, War in the Southern Oceans, 1939-45 (Cape Town, 1961), pp. 92-5; Martin Thomas, `After Mers-el-Kebir: The Armed Neutrality of the French Navy, 1940-43', ante, cxii (1997), 647, 658.

(2.) Turner, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 131; PRO, HS 3/28, S. G. A. Parsons (DO/MOs) to AD/W, 28 Nov. 1941, and AD4 to AD for CD, 1 Dec. 1941; HS 3/9, AD to CEO, 4 Dec. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/7, Jebb to Dawe, 11 Nov. 1941 [with draft enclosed], Dawe to Jebb, 13 Dec. 1941 [with draft enclosed], AD/W to CEO, 13 Dec. 1941, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to Chief Secretary, East African Governors' Conference, 15 Dec. 1941.

(2.) Nigel West, Secret War; The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organisation (London, 1992), p. 50; PRO, HS 3/9, memorandum on SOE East African Mission, 17 Dec. 1941; Gladwyn Jebb to FO, CO and DO, 17 Dec. 1941.

(3.) PRO, HS 3/7, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Nyasaland Governor, 24 Dec. 1941; From Nyasaland Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 Dec. 1941; Foreign Office to HM Consul in Beira and HM Consul general in Lourenco Marques, 1 Jan. 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/7, Dalton to Moyne, 10 Nov. 1941; AD to CEO, 13 Nov. 1941; Cipher Telegram [hereafter CT] from Durban, 11 Dec. 1941; CT from Nairobi, 17 Dec. 1941; Chief Secretary, East African Governors' Conference to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 Dec. 1941; GOC-in-C East Africa to War Office, 19 Dec. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/11, Private CT to Navycharge Durban, 21 Dec. 1941, CT from Durban, 22 Dec. 1941.

(2.) Ibid., DURBAN 12 Dec. 1941, CT from Durban 19 Nov. 1941. For details of Broad's career before and after his time in Southern Africa, cf. M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940--944 (London, 1966), p. 422. Foot also mentions Percy Mayer: ibid., pp. 380, 413.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/11, note of 22 Nov. 1941; HS 3/7 South Africa (H.C.) to D.O. 1 Jan. 1942; 203 Mission Pretoria to War Office, 2 Jan. 1942; Private CT from Pretoria 31 Dec. 1942; Turner, Southern Oceans, p. 109.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/7, ibid.; HS 3/12, CT from Durban 10 April 1942; D/CD to W/K, 4 Feb. 1942; HS 3/20, `Progress Report No.3', 28. March 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/21, `OP 3', 17 Apr. 1942; U[nited] S[tates] N[ational] A[archives] T[wo], RG59 851W.III/6, telegram from Tananarive [Carter] to Secretary of State, Washington, 15 Aug. 1941.

(2.) Peter Simpson-Jones, `The Lighter Side of Spying', pp. 11-12, transcript of a sound recording, both in the Imperial War Museum; PRO, HS 3/20, CT from Durban, 7 Apr. 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/12, `SOE East African Mission', note of 9 May 1942.

(2.) G. E. Maguire, Anglo-American Policy towards the Free French (Basingstoke, 1995), p. 36; The Complete Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle (New York, 1972), pp. 237-8; Thomas, `Imperial Backwater', 1059.

(3.) Lord Rennell of Rodd, British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years 1941-47 (Westport, 1970), p. 213; PRO, HS 3/8, GOC-in-C to War Office, 10 Mar. 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/28, Commandant Maerten, 29 Nov. 194z; telegram from Durban, 6 Feb. 1942; Caesar to CD, 12 Feb. 1942; HS 3/9, CT to Navycharge Durban, 18 Feb. 1942 and CT from Durban, 22 Feb. 1942; US NAT, RG59 740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/2136 Carter, Tananarive, to Secretary of State, Washington, 14 Mar. 1942.

(2.) PRO HS 3/21, `Meeting at Admiralty on 15.3.42, 10 a.m. [re] BONUS/IRONCLAD.'

(1.) J. R. M. Butler (ed.), Grand Strategy (6 vols. in 7, London, 1956-76) iii.490-91; PRO, WO 208/1518, M.L3a/App./M.6, 22 March 1942; David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1939--1945 (London, 1971), p. 449; Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 327--8; Randolph S. Churchill and Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill (8 vols., London, 1966-88), vii.95-6; Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan (5 vols., London, 1957-69), ii.1229; GB Cabinet Office, Principal War Telegrams and Memoranda, 1940-1943. India (Nendeln, 1976), p. 165; Thomas, `Imperial Backwater', 1056.

(1.) B[undesarchiv] M[ilitararchiv] F[reiburg], RM 7/1749, Fremde Heere West, `Die britisch-amerikanischen Moglichkeiten gegen Europa und Afrika im Jahre 1942', 1 Mar. 1942; Neil Orpen (ed.), South African Forces World War II (6 vols., Cape Town, 1968-77), iv.386; PRO, HS 3/21, `Progress Report No.5 period 24.3.42 to 30.4.42'; Kirby (ed.), War Against Japan, ii. 134.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/21, CT from Durban, 27 Apr. 1942, DM [Morton] to General Ismay, 28 Apr. 1942, AD/Wa to AD/W, 28 Apr. 1942, Ismay to First Sea Lord etc, 28 Apr. 1942, Morton to Brien Clarke, 29 Apr. 1942, CT to Navycharge Durban 1 May 1942.

(3.) PRO, HS 3/14, `An Account of SOE operations in Africa', p. 5; HS 3/20, W/S to AD/W, 15 May 1942; HS 3/22, CT from Durban, 10 May 1942; HS 3/23, W/S to CD, Diary of Ironclad Second Edition (Revised), 14 May 1942; HS 3/27, Flag Officer Commanding Force F's No. 60/48, dated 16 July 1942.

(1). Foot, SOE, pp. 30-31; Ben Pimlott (ed), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-45 (London, 1986), p. 421; The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 108; PRO, HS, 3/9, Madagascar 10 May 1941, handwritten note by Ada dated 9 May 1941.

(1). Non-attributable source; PRO, HS 3/21, CT from Durban, 4 May 1942; CT from Durban, 5 May 1942; HS 3/22, CT from Durban, 21 May 1942; CT to Durban, 14 May 1942; DZ to W.S., 22 June 1942; HS 3/9, AD/S to SO, 26 June 1942, handwritten note by Selborne.

(2.) PRO, PREM 3/405/9, S(elborne) to Prime Minister, 14 July 1942, Quarterly Report of SOE Activities March-June 1942, and Prime Minister, 23 July 1942.

(3.) Kirby (ed.), War Against Japan, ii.137; S. W. Roskill, The War At Sea, 1939-1945 (3 vols. in 4, London, 1954-61), ii. 189; Ministry of Defence (NAVY), [Naval Staff History], War with Japan (6 vols., London, 1995), iii.4.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14. `An Account of SOE's African operations' p. 5; Kirby (ed.), War Against Japan, ii. 140; HS 3/20, `Progress Report No. 6', 25 May 1942; HS 3/12, CT from Durban, 8 July 1942.

(2.) Turner, Southern Oceans, pp. III, 142; Charles Eade (ed.), The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill (3 vols., London, n.d.) ii.265-66, `Prime Minister for Two Years. A World Broadcast May 10, 1942.'

(1.) Kirby (ed.), War Against Japan, ii.58; Butler (ed.), Grand Strategy, iii.491; Admiralty, Fuhrer Conferences on Naval Affairs (7 vols., 1947), iv. 20; Akten Zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik, 1918-1945 Serie E: 1941-1945 (8 vols., Gottingen, 1969-79), ii.80-81; Hinsley (ed.), British Intelligence in the Second Worm War, ii.85; PRO, WO 208/1518 `Reports concerning MADAGASCAR appearing in BJs', 22 March 1942. A `BJ' or `Black Jumbo' was a translated decrypt of an intercepted diplomatic signal.

(2.) BMF, RM 7/253, `Vermerk ueber die Hauptpunkte der Unterredung Vizeadmiral Fricke mit Vizeadmiral Nomura', 8 Apr. 1942 and 13 May 1942, Ambassador Ott, 15 May 1942; Turner, Southern Oceans, p. 117; Salewski, Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung, ii.53.

(1.) Turner, Southern Oceans, pp. 136-7.

(2.) Orpen (ed.), South African Forces, iv.389-95; Thomas, `Imperial Backwater', 1063; PRO, HS 3/22, From Todd, 4 June 1942; Jean van der Poel (ed), Selections from the Smuts Papers (7 vols., Cambridge, 1966-73), vi.366-67; Turner, Southern Oceans, p. 141.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/11, AD/A to CD, 29 July 1941, `East African Mission. Terms of Reference,' 4 Aug. 1941; HS 3/7, CT from Durban 14 Nov. 1941; HS 3/10, CT from Durban, 25 May 1942, CD to AD/W, 30 May 1942, private CT from Durban, 8 June 1942; HS 3/9, Foreign Office to H. M. G. Jebb, 27 Sept. 41; Orpen (ed.), South African Forces, iv.397; HS 3/22, CT from Durban, 20 May 1942; HS 3/12, L. J. Carver to Colonel D. R. Guinness SOE, 9 July 1942.

(2.) Alfred Hitchcock (dir.), Aventure Malgache (Phoenix Films, 1944); PRO, ADM 199/1278, telegram 0888 from Durban, 16 July 1942.

(1.) PRO, ADM 223/564, CT GOC-in-C East Africa, 27 July 1942, two CTs Chiefs of Staff, 3 Aug. 1942, CT East Africa Command, 4 Aug. 1942, CT GOC-in-C East Africa, 12 Aug. 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14, `An Account of SOE operations in Africa', p. 6; HS 3/22, Durban CT, 25 June 1942; NS 3/20, `Progress Report No.9, 25 Aug. 1942; NS 3/26, Durban CT, 2 Aug. 1942, Caesar CT, 3 Aug. 1942, GOC-in-C East Africa, 10 Aug. 1942.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/26, `operation Order No. "Frontier"' la, 17 Aug. 1942; Durban CT for Caesar, 24 Aug. 1942, CT to Durban, 25 Aug. 1942, Durban CT for Caesar 26 Aug. 1942; NS 3/27, Madagascar, 7 Sept. 1942, `SOE participation in STREAM, LINE, JANE', 8 Sept. 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/27, `SOE Participation in Streamline', 14 Sept. 1942, and 'Report on Second Combined operations Madagascar', 20 Nov. 1942; ADM 199/1278, CT from GOC-in-C East Africa to War Office, 26 Aug. 1942.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14, `An Account of SOE Operations in Africa', p. 6; HS 3/27, CT Durban for Caesar, 11 Sept. 1942 and 'The SOE Role in Stream Line Jane', 2 Oct. 1942; ADM 223/564, War Office to British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 13 Sept. 1942; WO 174/2, Madagascar War Diaries 1942 June-October G.S.; King's College London Liddell Hart Centre, Dimoline Papers VIII/5, `An Account of the Operations of 22 (E.A.) INF. BDE. 10 Sept. 42-6 Nov. 42', p. ii.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14, `An Account of SOE Operations in Africa', p. 6; HS 3/27, CT from Durban for Caesar, 11 Sept. 1942; CT from Durban personal for Caesar, 11 Sept. 1942; Caesar to Hambro, 14 Sept. 1942; `The SOE Role in Stream Line Jane', 2 Oct. 1942; HS 3/9, `Report on Second Combined Operations Madagascar', 20 Nov. 1942; HS 3/12, Platt to War Office, 5 Oct. 1942, CT from Durban 15 Oct. 1942; WO 174/2, Madagascar War Diaries 1942 June-October G.S.; CO 968/3/12, `Operations of East African Command 1941-43'.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/14, AD4 to CD, 5 Nov. 1942, CD to General Kennedy, 4 Dec. 1942, Directive from CD to WS, 16 Dec. 1942; HS 3/12, W to AD/U, 9 Dec. 1942; information from SOE Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14, W.S. to W. London, 'Note on a Conversation with G.O.C. in C. East Africa'; HS 3/29, CT from Capetown, 24 May i943.

(2.) PRO, HS 3/9, CD to Sir Alexander Hardinge, 19 May 1943, Hardinge to CD, 20 May 1943, CD to Hardinge, 23 May 1943, Hardinge to CD, 25 May 1943.

(1.) J. Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials (London, 1953) pp. 62, 173; PRO, HS 3/9, CD to SO, 23 Nov. 1942, written comment by Selborne.

(2.) `C' was a symbol for the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service and was often used by other agencies to refer to the Secret Intelligence Service.

(3.) David Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service (London, i997), pp. 185, 188, 237, 276, 297; PRO, HS 3/10, AD4 to CD, 12 Oct. 1942 and 17 Nov. 1942, Morton to CD, 17 Nov. 1942 and BMC to Morton, 13 May 1942; HS 3/9, AD to DEO, 4 Dec. 1941.

(1.) PRO, HS 3/14, W to CD, 3 Dec. 1942, CD to AD/S, 5 Dec. 1942, Personal CT from Durban, 16 Nov. 1942; HS 3/9, CT from Durban, 17 March 1942.; NS 3/83, AD/S [Selborne's secretary] to C.D., 2 Feb. 1943; HS 3/24, `South African Progress Report, 24 Sept. 1943'.

E. D. R. HARRISON University of Salford