Failed Attempt to Break Up the Oligopoly in Sovereign Credit Rating Market after Financial Crises.

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Author: Alicja Malewska
Date: June 2021
From: Contemporary Economics(Vol. 15, Issue 2)
Publisher: University of Finance and Management in Warsaw
Document Type: Article
Length: 6,977 words
Lexile Measure: 1360L

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Abstract :

For decades, the credit rating market has been dominated by three major agencies (Moody's, S&P and Fitch Ratings). Their oligopolistic dominance is especially strong in sovereign credit ratings industry, where they hold a collective global share of more than 99%. Global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis exposed serious flaws in rating process and forced public authorities to act. This study investigates effectiveness of new regulations adopted in the United States and in the European Union after financial crises in terms of reducing oligopolistic dominance of the "Big Three" in sovereign credit ratings market. The study applies descriptive statistical analysis of economic indicators describing concentration rate in a market, as well as content analysis of legal acts and case study methodology. Analysis shows that the Dodd-Frank reform and new European rules on supervision of credit rating agencies were not effective enough and did not lead to the increased competition in the market. The evidence from this study is explained using two alternative perspectives - economic theory of natural oligopoly and hegemonic stability theory coming from international relations field. KEY WORDS: Credit rating agencies, oligopoly, sovereign ratings, financial crisis. JEL Classification: F34, F59, G15, G28.

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A665893713