German philosopher of outstanding ability and influence; b. Königsberg, East Prussia, April 22, 1724; d. there, Feb. 12, 1804. Kant's father was a harness maker of ability. The spiritual climate of his family was that of orthodox Lutheranism intermingled with pietistic elements. Kant himself never traveled farther than the province of Königsberg; he left the city but seldom, and then only for short stays in the country. He began his graduate studies in 1740 at the University of Königsberg and earned his doctorate in philosophy there in 1755. His Habilitationsschrift at the university was a work on the first principles of metaphysics. He remained an instructor until 1770, when he was appointed ordinary professor of logic and metaphysics. Kant was popular and much esteemed as a professor at the university; after 1781, in fact, he came to be recognized as one of the most famous men of his time. His way of life was always simple and rigorously ordered; he spent his days working seriously and with a sense of duty that may be characterized as stoic. Although he had no family of his own, he had the inclination and the time for sociability, and in spite of a weak physical constitution he lived to old age.
Development and Works. The line development of Kant's philosophical activity may be seen in his works.Page 120 | Top of Article There is a clear contrast between two periods: from the years 1769/1770 and on his precritical thought gradually gave way to his critical philosophy. During the precritical period Kant mainly followed the thought patterns of the rationalist Enlightenment, proceeding along the paths traced by G. W. LEIBNIZ and C. WOLFF. At the same time he somehow transcended this movement by taking into account the irrationalistic philosophy of emotions that he had learned from the work of J. J. ROUSSEAU. Again, he manifested strong interest in mathematics and the natural sciences; here he had high regard for Sir Isaac Newton, whom he considered his master. Chief among the works of this period are his Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (Königsberg 1755; tr. W. Hastie in Kant's Cosmogony, Glasgow 1900) and Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (Königsberg 1763). In the latter work he attempts to develop a proof of God's existence that is completely a priori. This proof gives a new foundation for causal thinking and thus develops the true sense of the cosmological and teleological proof of God's existence. However, the rational surface current lost some of its force because of the irrational undercurrent. The following words are indicative of this trend: "It is absolutely necessary to convince oneself of the existence of God; but it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." This formulation already contains a foreboding of the critical period.
In the second phase of Kant's philosophical development, the irrational element gains the upper hand and rational metaphysics disappears. As Kant himself expresses it, he was roused from his "dogmatic slumber" through Hume's remarks on the law of causality. D. HUME maintained that the necessity that, according to traditional metaphysics, links the effect to its cause and ultimately leads to the first cause cannot be inferred either from the connection of concepts (a priori) or from experience (a posteriori). This position was taken up by Kant, who extended the argument to all necessary connections between concepts and, in so doing, raised the general question as to the possibility of experience and science and, above all, of metaphysics. Kant endeavored to solve this problem in his main work, the Critique of Pure Reason (Riga 1781, 2d ed. 1787; tr. N. K. Smith, 2d ed., London 1933). The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Riga 1783; tr. P. Carus, rev. L. W. Beck, New York 1950) gives a short introduction and a synthetical presentation of this work. To the investigation of the theoretical realm (the field of knowing) Kant added the study of the practical realm (the field of moral action). Thus his main ethical work was titled the Critique of Practical Reason (Riga 1788; tr. L. W. Beck, Chicago 1949); three years previously, as a precursor to this, Kant had published his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Riga 1785; tr. H. J. Paton, London 1950). His Critique of Judgment (Berlin 1790; tr. J. H. Bernard, 2d ed. London 1931) is intimately connected with the two great critiques just mentioned. It deals with the faculty that plays an intermediary role between knowing and willing and that he identifies as judgment and feeling in one; its contents show that it deals with aesthetics and critical teleology. To the critique of religion Kant devoted his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (Königsberg 1793; tr. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson, Glasgow 1934). His Metaphysics of Ethics (Königsberg 1797; tr. J. W. Semple, 3d ed. Edinburgh 1886) deals with problems of ethics and the philosophy of law. Finally, the Opus postumum (Tübingen 1920, 1938) gives a valuable glimpse into Kant's ultimate development and into the transition from his thought to German IDEALISM.
Philosophy of Criticism. Criticism is Kant's original achievement; it identifies him as one of the greatest thinkers of mankind and as one of the most influential authors in contemporary philosophy. But it is important to understand what Kant means by criticism, or critique. In a general sense, the term refers to the cultivation of reason by way of "the secure path of a science" (B xxx). More particularly, its use is not negative but positive, a fact that finds expression in the famous sentence: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (B xxx). Correspondingly, its negative use consists in not allowing oneself to "venture with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience" (B xxiv). Thus criticism removes the decisive hindrance that threatens to supplant or even to destroy the "absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason… in which it [pure reason] inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility" (B xxv). Accordingly, the critique guarantees a secure path for science by confining speculative reason to its own limits and by giving practical reason the complete use of its rights—rights that thus far had not been recognized.
Place in the History of Ideas. Kant, being confronted with the two extremes of RATIONALISM and EMPIRICISM, set for himself the task of creating a synthesis between them. As he saw it, rationalism operates in the sphere of innate ideas, with their analytical and therefore aprioristic necessity; this necessity, however, is not based on experience and consequently does not apply to reality itself. On the other hand, empiricism starts completely from experience and thus (it seems) from reality, but it arrives only at a posteriori and therefore synthetic statements that lack necessity. Kant sought to unite the concept and experience; he sought a necessity that extends to the order of objective reality and an order of objective reality that in itself contains necessity. This interpenetration finds its expression in judgments that are a priori and yet synthetic,Page 121 | Top of Article on the one hand, and synthetic and yet a priori, on the other. Kant thought that he could attain this goal only by way of a "changed point of view" (B xvi) referred to as a "Copernican revolution." On the supposition, thus far considered to be valid, that "all our knowledge must conform to objects" (ibid.), a priori judgments that enlarge man's knowledge synthetically are impossible. Here one needs the opposite assumption, according to which "we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge" (ibid.); only in this way are we able "to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given" (ibid.). Consequently, "we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them" (B xviii); this means that the process of knowing a priori "has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing-in-itself as indeed real per se, but as not known by us" (B xx). Since, however, all of metaphysics aims at the thing-in-itself, speculative reason, by which, as has been said, we "never transcend the limits of possible experience" (B xix), is unable to rise to the metaphysical level.
Critique of Knowledge. Kant perfects his criticism of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason, which moves from transcendental aesthetics to transcendental logic; and, within the latter, from transcendental analytics to transcendental dialectics. See TRANSCENDENTAL (KANTIAN). Throughout, the investigation revolves around the synthetic a priori judgments that have already been mentioned; these are synthetic insofar as they extend knowledge through a predicate that is not contained in the concept of the subject; they are a priori insofar as they have a necessary and universal validity, and this previous to any actual experience of individual cases. All of this, however, leads to the question: "How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" (B 19). To put it more accurately, these judgments are questioned as to the conditions for their possibility; such conditions, on the terms of the Copernican revolution, can be found only in the subject. Kant here develops his transcendental method, a method by which he transcends a priori knowledge and arrives at the level of the conditions for its possibility, which are already marked out in the subject.
Mathematics and natural science, for him, have already followed the certain path of science. Thus, as he points out in detail, they contain a number of synthetic a priori judgments that are valid without further discussion. Consequently, one has to prove not that they are valid, but how their accepted validity is possible. To explain this, Kant goes back to the distinction between matter and form in human knowledge. The matter coincides with sensation; this is "the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it" (A 19); only in this way "can the object be given to us" (ibid.). Matter, taken a posteriori as unordered multiplicity, has as its opposite complement form, "in which alone the sensations can be posited" and connected "in certain relationships" (A 20); this form must "lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind" (ibid.). At this point one must explain the three domains of a priori forms.
First is the region of sense knowledge. This is the field of "receptivity" by which "we are affected by the objects" (A 19); "objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions" (ibid.). Now, that intuition is called empirical "which is in relation to the object through sensation" (A 20) and which therefore is based on received impressions. By way of contrast, a pure intuition is that in which "there is nothing that belongs to sensation" (ibid.); it is "the pure form of sensibility" (ibid.) and is actuated in the mind a priori, even without a given object. Correspondingly, transcendental aesthetics is "the science of all principles of a priori sensibility" (A 21); but these are two, "namely, space and time" (A 22), and they are the conditions for the possibility of the a priori synthetic judgments of mathematics. Space is more particularly the form of the external sense faculties, i.e., "the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us" (A26). Time, on the other hand, is "the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state" (A 33). Again, time is "the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever," because the external representations also "belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state" (A 34). To space and time is ascribed an "empirical reality" (A 35), that is, an objective validity, as the conditions that alone enable man to perceive objects; in the same way they have a "transcendental ideality" (A 36) insofar as they are "merely conditions of our sensibility" and cannot, in any way, be ascribed to "things as they are in themselves" (ibid.). Thus, it is true, they "make a priori synthetic propositions possible," but these "apply to objects only in so far as objects are viewed as appearances, and do not present things as they are in themselves" (A 39).
Second is the area of reason. As "spontaneity [in the production] of concepts," reason cooperates with the sense faculties, which are "receptivity for impressions"; through these impressions the object is "given," whereas through reason it is "thought" (A 50). Knowledge can arise "only through their union," for "thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind" (A 51). Everything depends on the pure concepts; in these "there is no mingling of sensation," and they concern only "the form of the thought of an object in general" (A 50–51). Thus transcendental analytics consists in the "dissection of the faculty of understanding itself" insofar as, in this faculty, the pure concepts as inPage 122 | Top of Article "their birthplace," have been located and prepared in an a priori way (A 65–66). It is thus that the synthetic a priori judgments of natural science are explained with regard to their possibility. Here the question is how to seek pure concepts on the basis of a single principle and how to "determine in an a priori manner their systematic completeness" (A 67). Because reason reaches only to "the mediate knowledge of an object" (A 68) or judgments, it constitutes "a faculty of judgment" (A 69). The elementary forms of judgment are outlined in it; from the point of view of "the mere form of understanding" they can be classified "under four heads, each of which contains three moments" (A 70). Coordinated to these are the 12 "pure concepts of understanding" (e.g., substance, causality, etc.) "which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general" (A 79); as "the true, primary concepts of the pure understanding" they are called "the categories" (A 81). To the process of educing them is linked transcendental deduction, which shows that the categories are "conditions of the possibility of experience and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience" (B 161). However, objects must be understood not as things in themselves, but as "appearances in space and time" that are determined by the categories (B 168–169). "Consequently, there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects of possible experience" (B 166). Subject to the same limitations are the principles that teach reason (being the potency for judging) how "to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding" (A 132). To these principles belong the "principle of succession in time in accordance with the law of causality: All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (A 189, B 232).
Third is the study of the intellect, which is the concern of transcendental dialectics. Here the synthetic a priori judgments of metaphysics are examined as to their possibility. The question is not how they are possible, but simply whether they are possible. Kant's answer is that they are not. Here his concern is to show the "transcendental illusion" (A 297); it is a "natural and inevitable illusion" (A 298), and thus it has been able to lead metaphysics astray until now. The critique must be applied to "transcendental principles" that, in contrast to "immanent" principles, lead man to go beyond "the limits of possible experience" (A 295). At the basis of these principles one finds "transcendental ideas," designed by reason in an a priori and necessary fashion; "no object adequate to the transcendental idea can ever be found within experience"; "for they view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined by an absolute totality of conditions," by "an absolute whole" (A 327), or even by "an unconditioned [reality]" (A 323), whereas "no experience is unconditioned" (A 326). From the different ways of drawing conclusions, Kant gathers that there are three and only three ideas, namely, the soul as "the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject," the world as "the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance," and God as "the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general" (A 334). These ideas "never allow of any constitutive employment … as supplying concepts of certain objects" (A644). In other words, the objects that are outlined in these ideas are never recognized through them; for ideas that go as far as the thing-in-itself remain empty, because the intellectual intuition that complements them and reaches out into the realm of the thing-in-itself has not been given to man. Or, one should say, man's "nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible" (A51). On the other hand, these same ideas have an "indispensably necessary, regulative employment" insofar as they put before the intellect the "form of a whole of knowledge" and in this way "determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts" (A 644–645). This delimitation of their use is opposed by the "sophistications" that rise "from the very nature of reason" (A 339) and claim to form a bridge from ideas to their corresponding objects. The four paralogisms intend to proceed "from the transcendental concept of the subject" to a science "concerning the nature of our thinking being" (A 340, 345). Just as "rational psychology" (A342) is impossible, so also is "rational cosmology" (A408). When the latter is attempted as "the absolute totality … of conditions for any given appearance" (A 340), reason is entangled in the four antinomies (e.g., the limitation vs. the boundlessness of the universe in space and time). In like fashion, there can be no rational theology (A 63l); for all three kinds of proof for the existence of God are inconclusive (A 590). "The physico-theological proof … rests upon the cosmological proof, and the cosmological upon the ontological [proof]" (A 630), which itself suffers from an illegitimate transition from the realm of concepts to the realm of reality. What is left of God is only the "transcendental ideal" as the "concept of all reality" and "the complete determination of things," "without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and be itself a thing" (A 580).
Critique of Morality. Whereas the theoretical reason, or strict knowledge, can use ideas only in a regulative manner and concepts only within the realm of the PHENOMENA (in contrast to the NOUMENA), practical reason, or morality, goes on to the objective use of ideas and to extending the application of concepts to the noumena. Here Kant finds a basic fact, a given reality beyond any doubt: the CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE as the "fundamental law of pure practical reason." It is: "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same timePage 123 | Top of Article as the principle of a universal legislation" (Critique of Practical Reason; ed. Cassirer, 5:35). This "synthetic proposition a priori" is not based on "any pure or empirical intuition"; but it presents itself as something that "forces itself upon us" (36). In it the "pure will" is conceived as "determined by the mere form of the law"(35); on the other hand, "the material of volition," being the "object of a desire," takes away morality (38). As opposed to this "heteronomy," one finds "autonomy" to be "the sole principle of all moral laws" (38), and in this principle pure reason is "originally legislative" (36). Moral acting is not only conditionally, viz, "to make a desired effect possible," but it is "unconditionally commanded" (36). Therefore, it is "not limited to human beings" but extends to all rational beings, even "the Infinite Being" (37); however, it presents itself only to man as an "obligation" whose fulfillment brings him closer to the holiness of the Divine Being.
By reason of the unconditional or absolute quality of the moral law, pure reason is authorized to make "an extension in its practical use which is not possible to it in its speculative use" (57). In this way Kant arrives at the postulates, which are not "theoretical dogmas but presuppositions of necessarily practical import." They do not expand "speculative knowledge, but they give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason" (143); here the pure will shows itself as "belonging to a pure intelligible world" (57). "These postulates are those of immortality, of freedom affirmatively regarded (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world), and of the existence of God" (143). They evoke assent not through insight, but through "pure practical faith." One says: I will those things that correspond to the postulates to be reality, "I stand by this and will not give up this belief" (155). At this point "my interest inevitably determines my judgment because I will not yield anything of this interest" (ibid.). Thus the practical metaphysics of faith, for which room had been made by abolishing the theoretical metaphysics of pure knowledge, is shown by Kant to be the center of gravity in human thought.
Critique of Aesthetic Experience. This critique deals with the transition that constitutes the ultimate unity of reason. Here the faculty of judgment forms "a middle between understanding and reason" (Critique of Judgment; ed. Cassirer, 5:245). In like manner "the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" stands "between the faculties of knowledge and desire" (ibid.). The reflective (as opposed to the determining) power of judgment rises from "the particular" to "the universal" (248). In this it is guided by the a priori principle of "finality," which, however, reflects only on the "nexus of phenomena in nature," and should not be ascribed to nature itself (249). Finality is also found in the fact that nature is in keeping with the "need of understanding" to discover repeatedly the comprehensive principles in the apparently "heterogeneous laws" and phenomena of nature (255–256). The fulfillment of this need gives "a very appreciable pleasure"; even "the feeling of pleasure … is determined by a ground which is a priori and valid for all men: and that, too, merely by virtue of the reference of the object to our faculty of cognition" without considering the practical finality attached to the faculty of desire (256).
More particularly, one must distinguish the aesthetic judgment from the teleological judgment (262). The first consists in "the faculty of estimating formal finality (otherwise called subjective) by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure"; the latter refers to "the faculty of estimating the real finality (objective) of nature by understanding and reason" (262). More precisely, "the aesthetic representation of finality" is present when the representation of an object is "immediately coupled with the feeling of pleasure" (258). But this pleasure is caused through the fact that "the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties" is "brought into play in the reflective judgment" and establishes a harmonious interplay, particularly between the imagination and the intellect (258–259). The object with whose representation "pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily" is called beautiful; "the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity)" is taste (259). Accordingly, "the beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally" (289) or "is cognized as object of a necessary delight" (311), and this "apart from any interest" (279) or "apart from the representation of an end" (306), which would appeal not to feeling but to desire.
Critique of Religion. According to Kant, religion consists in the "recognition of all duties as divine commands" (Critique of Practical Reason, 140); this, however, does not mean that they are "arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a foreign will" (ibid.). He who fulfills the obligation out of consideration of God, out of "fear or hope," falls into a heteronomy that "would destroy the entire moral worth of the actions" (ibid.). However, the moral law orders man to strive after "the highest possible good," and one must follow this law without self-interest and purely as an obligation (ibid.). This highest good includes "the greatest degree of moral perfection" and the "greatest happiness" corresponding to it (141). But because only "a holy and beneficent Author of the world" is able to guarantee such a correspondence, it is possible for one to hope for the highest good only when his will is in accord with God's will (ibid.). It is only in this sense that obligations, though they are "essential laws of any free will, … must [still] be regardedPage 124 | Top of Article as commands of the Supreme Being" (140). Religion is ultimately "the disposition, accompanying all our actions, to perform these as though they were being executed in the service of God" (Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason; ed. Cassirer, 6:346). All religious activity (e.g., prayer) reduces to this; everything that goes beyond it is characterized by Kant as "a superstitious illusion"(345). Only such a religion based on reason and restricted to the field of morals is permitted; only this constitutes the true core of the Christian religion of revelation, which degenerates into "practical superstition" and "clericalism" (325–327) when it pretends to be more than it is.
Critical Appraisal. With the ability of a genius, Kant aspired to create a grand synthesis between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge and between man's theoretical and practical activity. He developed his transcendental method in order to achieve this synthesis. In this undertaking he was able to attain noteworthy results: the unity of human cognition, its necessity and universality, the significance of the a priori, the absoluteness of the moral imperative, the foundation of existence in the metaphysical order, and the transcendental problematics. Yet Kant's synthesis, taken as a whole, failed. It did so because he remained too much subject to the limitations of his own historical situation and, therefore, was not able to go deep enough and penetrate to ultimate depths.
From the point of view of M. Heidegger, one may summarize Kant's failure in his being unaware of BEING. How much Kant succumbs to this is clearly shown by his distinction between reason and intellect. The reason is rightly considered the faculty that, by way of fundamental concepts or categories, permeates sensible phenomena; this is equivalent to the ratio of St. THOMAS AQUINAS and its corresponding QUIDDITY, or quidditas rei materialis. Kant's intellect, on the other hand, reaches out into the metaphysical realm with its three ideas, but is never able really to penetrate it. The basis for this restriction lies in intellect's having lost, for Kant, its proper orientation toward being as all-inclusive—an orientation that enables man to enter the metaphysical realm in the first place. For St. Thomas, on the contrary, intellectus is intrinsically ordered to ens, which is grounded in esse. In this connection, Kant considers intellect as completely excluded from any form of intellectual INTUITION, whereas for St. Thomas intellectus participates in such intuition through its grasp of being, but without having it as such. Consequently, in St. Thomas's view man enters into the realm of the absolute on the theoretical level; here he is in communication with all other intelligent beings, including the divine mind. Kant relegates all this to the practical realm alone.
The transcendental method can be carried through in a way that goes beyond Kant himself to arrive at being as the primary condition for the possibility of human knowledge, and even of all human action. This basic idea has far-reaching consequences. The proof for God's existence is somehow precontained in the orientation of intellect toward being; thus does theoretical metaphysics become possible. Being, too, enables a priori knowledge to reveal rather than conceal, as it must do for Kant. Again, the formal objects of the soul's faculties for St. Thomas correspond to Kant's forms; thus knowledge through categories is not restricted to that which is "for man," but opens up to that which is "in itself." Finally, the absoluteness of the moral imperative also receives its foundation in being, and thus theory and practice are brought into harmony and unity.
Bibliography: Works. Gesammelte Schriften, 22 v. (Berlin 1902–42), critical ed. sponsored by the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Immanuel Kants Werke, ed. E. CASSIRER, 11 v. (Berlin 1912–18). General studies. F. C. COPLESTON, History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md. 1946–1963) v.6. J. D. COLLINS, A History of Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee 1954). S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Introduzione allo studio di K. (2d ed. Milan 1951). M. CAMPO, La genesi del criticismo kantiano (Varese 1953–). V. MATHIEU, La filosofia trascendentale e l'"Opus postumum" di K. (Turin 1958). H. J. DE VLEESCHAUWER, La Déduction transcendantale dans l'oeuvre de K, 3 v. (Antwerp 1934–37); L'Évolution de la pensée kantienne (Paris 1939). K. VORLÄNDER, I. Kant: Der Mann und das Werk, 2 v. (Leipzig 1924). M. WUNDT, Kant als Metaphysiker (Stuttgart 1924). J. MARÉCHAL, Le Point de départ de la métaphysique, v.3 (3d ed. Paris 1944) v.5 (2d ed. 1949). Catholic and fundamental. M. AEBI, K.s Begründung der "Deutschen Philos" (Basel 1947). G. MARTIN, I. Kant: Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie (Cologne 1951). Tulane University, A Symposion on K. (New Orleans 1954). J. B. LOTZ, ed., Kant und die Scholastik heute (Pullach 1955). H. HEIMSOETH, Studien zur Philosophie I. Kants (Cologne 1956). F. DELEKA, I. Kant: Hist.-krit. Interpretation der Hauptschriften (Heidelberg 1963). Theoretical philosophy. M. HEIDEGGER, K. und das Problem der Metaphysik (Bonn 1929); Die Frage nach dem Ding (Tübingen 1962). C. NINK, Kommentar zu K.s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Frankfurt 1930). H. J. PATON, K.s Metaphysics of Experience (New York 1936). F. GRAYEFF, Deutung und Darstellung der theoretischen Philosophie K.s (Hamburg 1951). H.W. CASSIRER, Kant's First Critique (New York 1954). R. P. WOLFF, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass. 1963). Practical philosophy. G. KRÜGER, Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik (Tübingen 1931). R. DAVAL, La Métaphysique de Kant (Paris 1951). A. R. DUNCAN, Practical Reason and Morality (London 1957). H. J. PATON, The Categorical Imperative (3d ed. London 1959). J. SCHMUCKER, Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflektionen (Meisenheim 1961) Catholic and fundamental. Aesthetics. W. BIEMEL, Die Bedeutung von Kants Begründung der Ästhetik für die Philosophie der Kunst (Cologne 1959). Philosophy of religion. J. HASENFUSS, Die Grundlagen der Religion bei Kant (Würzburg 1927), Catholic. B. JANSEN, Die Religionsphilosophie Kants (Berlin 1929), Catholic.
[J. B. LOTZ]