Pandemic Preparedness

Citation metadata

Editors: Brenda Wilmoth Lerner and K. Lee Lerner
Date: 2016
Worldmark Global Health and Medicine Issues
Publisher: Gale, a Cengage Company
Document Type: Topic overview
Pages: 7
Content Level: (Level 5)
Lexile Measure: 1370L

Document controls

Main content

Full Text: 
Page 497

Pandemic Preparedness

Introduction

Pandemic preparedness enables countries to recognize and manage a pandemic (when an infectious disease becomes prevalent over an entire region or the world) through the use of established plans, preparations, and protocols. According to the “Checklist for Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Planning,” prepared by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2005, the goals of pandemic preparedness are to “help reduce transmission of the pandemic virus strain; to decrease the number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths; to maintain essential services; and to reduce the economic and social impact of a pandemic.”

Pandemics are unpredictable but recurring events that cause severe social, economic, and political stress. To mitigate the severity of that stress, advanced planning and preparedness are crucial. In the 21st century, this concept primarily has concerned existing and potential global outbreaks of the deadly influenza A strain, such as H1N1 (swine flu) and H5N1 (avian flu). However, historically a variety of diseases have gotten out of control and led to pandemics including measles, tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), and cholera.

A pandemic occurs when an infectious disease, such as a new subtype of a virus, emerges for which no one has an immunity. This typically triggers multiple simultaneous epidemics around the world, with many cases and many deaths. Outbreaks of various diseases happen all the time, and they may even carry a high death toll, but what causes a disease to become a pandemic is how quickly it spreads to large groups via chains of transmission. In the case of flu, this is from person to person. With the ease of global transportation and urbanization, epidemics such as the flu virus can travel rapidly around the world.

The WHO has recommended that countries develop national preparedness plans, specifically to lay out a strategies for handling a flu pandemic. Over the years, more than 140 countries have created national plans for flu pandemics, but according to the WHO, many of these plans will work for outbreaks of other highly transmissable diseases as well. The WHO also has urged countries to adopt its suggested framework for pandemic preparedness.

Pandemic preparedness plans sometimes take years to draft and are supposed to be detailed and comprehensive. This is because the most effective plans take what the WHO calls a “multisectoral” approach, meaning the plan involves “many levels of government, and people with various specialties including policy development, legislative review and drafting, animal health, public health, patient care, laboratory diagnosis, laboratory test development, communication expertise, and disaster management,” according to its 2005 “Checklist.”

Historical Background

History is replete with pandemics that struck fast, hard, and without warning. This historically has left governments and communities ill prepared to handle the catastrophic effects of these pandemics. Many of the worst events killed millions, sickened and left vulnerable millions more, ravaged economies, and shook social and political structures. Some even may have altered the course of history.

One of the first reported pandemics struck the Mesopotamian city of Seleucia (in modern-day Iraq) in 165 CE and spread to Rome. At one point the scourge, which scholars believe may have been either smallpox (an acute contagious viral disease, with fever and pustules usually leaving permanent scars) or measles (an infectious viral disease causing fever and a red rash on the skin), killed an estimated 2,000 Romans per day and even claimed the lives of Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121–180) and co-regent Lucius Verus (130–169).

The next deadliest pandemic struck the Byzantine Empire in 541 and was likely the first recorded case of the bubonic plague, a bacterial disease transmitted by Page 498  |  Top of Articlethe bite of infected fleas (or, in its pneumonic from, person to person), characterized by fever, delirium, and the formation of buboes (swollen, inflamed lymph nodes in the armpit or groin). Known as the plague of Justinian, the event quickly killed roughly 25 million and sickened Emperor Justinian (483–565), although he survived. In the capital city of Constantinople, as many as 5,000 people were dying per day. The plague of Justinian lasted just one year, and by its end about 40 percent of the city's population and roughly one-fourth of the eastern Mediterranean population were dead.

Sidebar: HideShow

RESPONSE TO 2009 SWINE FLU PANDEMIC

Pandemics, particularly of influenza, are generally fast moving and can take governments, health agencies, and the public by surprise. However, in theory, a properly formulated preparedness plan can help mitigate the effects of these events.

This was evident with the H1N1, “swine flu” outbreak in 2009. This was the first pandemic under the International Health Regulations, an international legal framework passed in 2005 and enacted in 2007, that legally bound World Health Organization (WHO) member countries to uphold certain obligations to prevent and mitigate a pandemic.

The first report of swine flu came from Veracruz, Mexico, in February 2009 where the virus had been circulating for months before it was noticed. A short time later, April 15, 2009, the first U.S. case of H1N1 (swine flu) was diagnosed, setting in motion a response by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to start working on a vaccine for the new virus. Just 11 days after that first report, the U.S. government declared H1N1 a public health emergency. Several U.S. states as well as the countries of Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Israel, and Germany had reported cases by the end of April.

At first, distribution of the vaccine was slow, and there was not enough of it, so the people at highest risk of complications were given priority for receiving it. By June 2009, 74 countries were affected by the pandemic. Before the pandemic was over, its reach was truly global, with all countries reporting cases.

Beyond distribution of the vaccine, the international community responded quickly with other measures. The European Union health commissioner urged people to postpone any nonessential travel to the United States and Mexico. The Public Health Agency in Canada mapped the genetic code of H1N1, the first time that had been done. The United Kingdom's national health service created a website that allowed people to self-assess symptoms and get antiviral medication in an attempt to alleviate the burden on healthcare providers.

In November 2009, cases were starting to decline, and more vaccination doses were available. Roughly 80 million people in the United States alone were vaccinated. On August 10, 2010, the WHO declared an end to the global H1N1 flu pandemic. The CDC estimates that 43 million to 89 million people had H1N1 between April 2009 and April 2010. They also estimated that there were between 8,870 and 18,300 H1N1-related deaths.

In the years since the pandemic, public health agencies and governments have worked to fix the shortcomings the event highlighted. Some of the changes include efforts at earlier detection of a potentially pandemic disease through access to online field reports, a renewed commitment from WHO member states to share vaccines, and continued work toward faster production and distribution of vaccines.

Yet this was nothing compared to the bubonic plague that devastated Europe and Asia from 1339 to 1351. At the time the plague hit, the global population has been estimated to be about 450 million. By its end, about 75 million people, including half the population in Europe, had died. Scientists and scholars believe the disease, also known as the Black Death, originated in China and was carried via infected fleas on shipboard rats along the Silk Road (a network of trade routes that linked the regions of the ancient world in commerce) to Sicily where it quickly spread.

Ensuing centuries would bring more waves of disease. Smallpox from 1775 to 1782 devastated North and Central America; tuberculosis (an infectious bacterial disease characterized by the growth of nodules in the tissues, especially the lungs) ravaged Europe and North America from 1800 to 1922; and seven cholera (an infectious and often fatal bacterial disease of the small intestine) pandemics since 1817 have killed millions globally.

That said, nothing prepared the world for what would become known as the deadliest pandemic in history. In its first 25 weeks, the Spanish flu that began in 1918 killed on average 1 million people per week worldwide and about 40 million by the time it ended abruptly in 1919. The flu spread quickly, exacerbated by close living quarters among troops fighting in World War I (1914–1918).

The disease came on quickly, with people feeling perfectly fine in the morning only to die by nightfall. Those who did not die from the flu itself often succumbed to complications caused by bacteria, such as pneumonia. Furthermore, whereas most flu strains are deadly primarily for the very old and the very young, this flu killed healthy adults mostly between the ages of 20 to 50 years old.

Flu viruses are so common there is a new pandemic at least once per generation. Since the 1918 pandemic there have been three major flu pandemics including the 2009–2010 H1N1 pandemic. Also known as the “swine flu” because of the strain's resemblance to a virus that afflicts pigs, this flu was particularly virulent. Before it subsided, between 43 million and 89 million people had H1N1 between April 2009 and April 2010, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). There were an estimated 8,870 to 18,300 H1N1-related deaths, reports the CDC.

Page 499  |  Top of Article

Among the recent global pandemics is HIV/AIDS. This retrovirus (a family of enveloped viruses that replicate in a host cell through the process of reverse transcription) is transmitted through bodily fluids and breaks down the body's immune system. Scientists think the virus first infected people in Africa sometime before 1937 but was not identified until the early 1980s. The disease initially spread slowly, but an epidemic among homosexual men in Western countries at the end of the 1970s eventually caught the attention of scientists and public health professionals. There is no cure for HIV/AIDS, although antiretroviral drugs seem to temper the disease, allowing those infected to live longer.

HIV/AIDS is an ongoing pandemic. The virus has infected more than 75 million people, killed more than 39 million, and remains a major global health concern. According to the WHO, there were approximately 35 million people living with HIV at the end of 2013, with 2.1 million people becoming newly infected with the virus that year. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for almost 70 percent of the global total of new HIV infections.

Impacts and Issues

There are myriad diseases that could cause a pandemic. For example, one that scientists and public health officials are watching is the coronavirus, which causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS, a severe form of pneumonia). This disease first appeared in China in 2002 and quickly caused 8,096 cases and 774 deaths. It spread to 26 countries before that wave fizzled out in 2003 because infection control procedures prevented further spread.

One of the most difficult viruses to contain is the influenza virus because of its ability to spread and mutate quickly, rendering vaccines developed to fight it ineffective. Outbreaks of flu occur annually, but occasionally a strain emerges that causes a worldwide pandemic, such as the Spanish flu of 1918. But even a typical flu year can cause seasonal outbreaks that sicken as many as 5 million and kill 500,000. Furthermore, the virus is endemic in several species, including humans, birds, and pigs.

The concern in the 21st century has been several avian influenza A viruses that have emerged, including H5N1 virus, first detected in 1997, and the H7N9 and Page 500  |  Top of ArticleH10N8 viruses, first reported in 2013. Any of these could hold potential for pandemic, but that is what frustrates scientists, public health officials, and the public: these diseases are unpredictable, with the only certainty being not if there will be a pandemic, but when.

 
Indonesian health officials conduct simulation exercises for Ebola preparedness involving mock plane passengers during the Ministry of Health's 50th anniversary celebrations near the National Monument, Jakarta, Indonesia, on November 12, 2014. The World Health Organization on October 13, 2014, urged East Asian and Pacific countries to strengthen defenses against the Ebola outbreak. The region of 1.8 billion has been a hot spot for many emerging diseases, including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza.

Indonesian health officials conduct simulation exercises for Ebola preparedness involving mock plane passengers during the Ministry of Health's 50th anniversary celebrations near the National Monument, Jakarta, Indonesia, on November 12, 2014. The World Health Organization on October 13, 2014, urged East Asian and Pacific countries to strengthen defenses against the Ebola outbreak. The region of 1.8 billion has been a hot spot for many emerging diseases, including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza.
© Sagarmata/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

This is particularly worrisome because pandemics share some common characteristics and challenges, including a rapid spread with a global reach among populations with little or no immunity to the disease. Because of this, health systems can become overwhelmed quickly. Most nations are not likely to have the staff, facilities, equipment, and hospital beds needed to cope with the sheer number of sick people coming through the doors. Putting plans in place to accommodate for such events is called surge capacity, which requires preparing to have enough staff, hospital beds, ventilators, medications, vaccines, coffins, morgue space, and so forth, in place if a pandemic occurs. For diseases where a vaccine is available and antivirals necessary, the supply is likely to be much smaller than the demand. In addition, if past pandemics are any indication, these viruses tend to spread globally in two or three waves of illness. Moreover, pandemics disrupt the economy and the regular function of society. From travel bans to event cancellations to school and business closings, pandemics can cause major financial and functional damage in a community.

Successful implementation of a comprehensive plan for addressing a pandemic can save many lives, although the unpredictability and rapid spread of pandemics will still exact a global toll. According to the WHO in its 2005 “Checklist for Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Planning,” “even in one of the more conservative scenarios, it has been calculated that the world will face up to 233 million outpatient visits, 5.2 million hospital admissions, and 7.4 million deaths globally, within a very short period.”

The international community had long recognized the need for coordination between countries in order to contain disease. Following cholera epidemics in Europe in the early 19th century, an 1851 conference in Paris produced the International Sanitary Regulations. These were revised and renamed the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969. By 1995, it had become clear that the IHR needed revision again, both to account for emerging infectious diseases and to better increase communication and coordination between countries in response to diseases. The revised version of IHR was completed in 2005 and went into force in 2007. The IHR is an international law that binds the WHO and its 194 member countries to uphold certain obligations when it comes to the prevention, control, and response to public health risks that may spread between countries. In addition to having a preparedness plan in place, member states also are obligated to notify the WHO, which the IHR establishes as the lead agency during an international public health crisis, of incidents that may affect public health. Other regulations govern international travel, including health measures for travelers and sanitary procedures at points of entry into a country.

The first test of this law came during the 2009–2010 swine flu outbreaks. While this framework created mechanisms for good communication, information sharing, and a recommended chain of command, it broke down in some key areas, according to Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg, in his 2014 review of the process for the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Pandemic Preparedness and Response—Lessons from the H1N1 Influenza of 2009.”

Among the challenges, Fineberg found, was that different countries had plans at varying levels of completion. Some countries and even the WHO did not have the budget or resources to implement certain mandated portions of the law, and the law lacked financial penalties or punitive trade sanctions should member states violate any portion of the law. Efforts to address these shortcomings are ongoing.

Moreover, the WHO states that another problem with the law is that different countries have different legislations, policies, regulations, and requirements that support IHR implementation to varying degrees. To that end, the WHO has been working with member countries to push through legislation at the national level to help smooth this process.

When it comes to the creating the plans themselves, the countries have to at minimum establish a procedure and leadership protocol to address preparing for an emergency, surveillance, case investigation and treatment, preventing spread of the disease in the community, maintaining essential services, and researching, evaluating, and implementing testing and revision of the national plan. To implement these plans, the WHO recommends what is called a “Whole of Society” approach, which emphasizes the importance of involving everyone—not just the health sector—in helping to contain the spread of a pandemic.

For example, national governments need to lead the overall coordination for preparedness. It is the governments' responsiblity to enact or modify legislation and policies in support of pandemic preparedness while also ensuring that resources are properly allocated. Governments are also best equipped to coordinate efforts across agencies both in the public and private sector to mobilize a broad response to a pandemic should the need arise.

Meanwhile, the health sector's responsibilities include providing reliable information on the risk, severity, and progression of a pandemic; prioritizing and continuing health care during a pandemic; enacting steps to reduce the spread of the disease in the community and in health-care facilities; and protecting and supporting health-care workers during a pandemic.

Under this approach, even businesses, communities, individuals, families, and civil society organizations have roles to play in mitigating the effect of a pandemic. For example, if electrical or water services are disrupted during a pandemic, the service providers are supposed to have a contingency plan so that if nothing else, they can Page 501  |  Top of Articleget power and water to medical facilities to ensure the facilities can continue to operate and provide care.

 
A microbiologist in the Influenza Branch at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducts an experiment inside a biological safety cabinet (BSC) within the Biosafety Level 3–enhanced laboratory. The airflow within the BSC helps prevent any airborne virus from escaping the confines of the cabinet, and as part of her personal protective equipment, she wears a powered air purifying respirator. She is inoculating 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs with a specimen containing an H5N1 avian influenza virus as part of a study to investigate the pathogenicity and transmissibility of newly emerging H5N1 viruses. Identification of genetic markers affecting the ability of H5N1 viruses to transmit efficiently helps in the early identification of emerging H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential, which is important for pandemic preparedness.

A microbiologist in the Influenza Branch at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducts an experiment inside a biological safety cabinet (BSC) within the Biosafety Level 3–enhanced laboratory. The airflow within the BSC helps prevent any airborne virus from escaping the confines of the cabinet, and as part of her personal protective equipment, she wears a powered air purifying respirator. She is inoculating 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs with a specimen containing an H5N1 avian influenza virus as part of a study to investigate the pathogenicity and transmissibility of newly emerging H5N1 viruses. Identification of genetic markers affecting the ability of H5N1 viruses to transmit efficiently helps in the early identification of emerging H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential, which is important for pandemic preparedness.
© Greg Knobloch/U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Furthermore, civil society organizations are expected to harness their various expertise and their close and direct relationship with the public to offer support as well as raise awareness and communicate accurate information to the public. For individuals and families, their primary responsibilities include making sure that they have access to accurate information, food, water, and medicines and are self-quarantining if necessary.

Future Implications

One of the major challenges outlined by Fineberg in the 2014 article analyzing the global response to the 2009 H1N1 epidemic was the failure of many member states to fulfill the requirements for pandemic preparedness mandated by the IHR. A WHO questionnaire distributed to member states in 2011 received only a 66 percent response rate, or 128 members of a total of 194. Of those who responded, only 58 percent had developed blueprints for achieving pandemic preparedness, and less than 10 percent reported having fully implemented the recommendations of the IHR.

Still, one of the biggest limitations in preparedness remains how little is known about pandemics. Fineberg notes that “the annals of influenza are filled with overly confident predictions based on insufficient evidence.” In reality, it is impossible to know which virus will emerge as the next pandemic, and how severe it will be, but more research can help mitigate the uncertainty.

Although information and even vaccine sharing between countries is improving, the traditional methods of vaccine production, particularly when it comes to the flu, cannot respond quickly enough to an emerging pandemic. The traditional model relies on growing vaccine viruses in eggs, which requires a large amount of eggs as well as time for the viruses to grow and replicate in the eggs. In 2013 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved a method of vaccine production that involves a “recombinant” vaccine virus (meaning that its genetic Page 502  |  Top of Articlematerial comes from different sources) that can replicate in insect cells. The fact that this methodology is not reliant on the egg supply or the availability of the influenza virus means that production can ramp up far more quickly.

Fineberg's analysis of the 2009 H1N1 epidemic acknowledged the challenges of readiness, including insufficient resources, the need for international coordination, and the difficulty inherent in making quick and measured decisions when a pandemic arises. Beyond better research and vaccine production, pandemic preparedness requires the full commitment to pandemic preparedness on the part of government and health agencies, including the provision of adequate funding for research and preparedness initiatives, proper staffing of public health leadership and analysis positions, and better coordination and information sharing between countries. Fineberg also offered this warning: “Whenever the next influenza pandemic arises, many more lives may be at risk. By heeding the lessons from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the international community will be able to cope more successfully the next time.”

Sidebar: HideShow

PRIMARY SOURCE

Pandemic Influenza Risk Management

SOURCE “Introduction,” from Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: WHO Interim Guidance. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO), 2013, 3. http://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/pandemic/GIP_PandemicInfluenzaRiskManagementInterimGuidance_Jun2013.pdf (accessed January 25, 2015).

INTRODUCTION This primary source is the introduction section from a World Health Organization (WHO) document providing guidance on pandemic preparedness for global leadership. WHO states that “Advance planning and preparedness are critical to help mitigate the impact of a pandemic.”

1. INTRODUCTION

The influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic was the first to occur since WHO had produced preparedness guidance. Guidance had been published in 1999, revised in 2005 and again in 2009 following advances in the development of antivirals and experiences with influenza A(H5N1) infections in poultry and humans. The emergence of the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus provided further understanding of influenza pandemics and requirements for pandemic preparedness and response. The report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 concluded: “The world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health emergency.”

The Review Committee recommended that WHO should revise its pandemic preparedness guidance to support further efforts at the national and subnational level. Revisions recommended included: simplification of the pandemic phases structure; emphasis on a risk-based approach to enable a more flexible response to different scenarios; reliance on multisectoral participation; utilization of lessons learnt at the country, regional and global level; and further guidance on risk assessment. The Review Committee's report reflected the broad experiences of Member States during the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic—and the key point that previous pandemic planning guidance was overly rigid. Member States had prepared for a pandemic of high severity and appeared unable to adapt their responses adequately to a more moderate event. Communications also proved to be of immense importance during the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic, within the health and non-health sectors and to the public. Provision of clear risk assessments to decision-makers placed significant strain on ministries of health, and effective communication with the public was challenging.

This 2013 guidance is based on the principles of all-hazards emergency risk management for health (ERMH), thereby aligning pandemic risk management with the strategic approach adopted by WHO, in accordance with World Health Assembly resolution 64.10. Commensurate with this approach, this guidance promotes building on existing capacities—in particular those under the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR [2005]) core capacities, in order to manage risks from pandemic influenza. Certain aspects of implementation of ERMH for national pandemic preparedness may therefore be linked with the core capacity strengthening activities required by the IHR (2005). This guidance can therefore be used as a model to illustrate how the mechanisms required for response to and recovery from pandemic influenza can be applied, as appropriate, to the management of all relevant health emergencies.

A risk-based approach to pandemic influenza management is emphasized and Member States are encouraged to develop flexible plans, based on national risk assessments. This guidance also places pandemic planning in the whole-of-society context. This 2013 revision therefore (1) reflects the approach taken at national level where pandemic influenza planning often rests with national disaster management authorities and (2) introduces or promotes all-hazards ERMH at Ministry of Health level, including mechanisms for wider national engagement.

This guidance also summarizes the roles and responsibilities of WHO relevant to pandemic preparedness, in terms of global leadership and support to Member States.

Page 503  |  Top of Article

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Knobler, Stacey L., et al., eds. The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready?: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005.

Lemon, Stanley M., et al. Ethical and Legal Considerations in Mitigating Pandemic Disease: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007.

Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: A WHO Guidance Document. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009.

Periodicals

Fineberg, Harvey V. “Pandemic Preparedness and Response—Lessons from the H1N1 Influenza of 2009.” New England Journal of Medicine 370, no. 14 (April 3, 2014): 1335–1342.

Morens, David M., Gregory K. Folkers, and Anthony S. Fauci. “What Is a Pandemic?” Journal of Infectious Diseases 200, no. 7 (August 2009): 1018–1021.

Websites

“The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009–April 2010.” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm (accessed March 20, 2015).

“About Pandemics.” Flu.gov . http://www.flu.gov/pandemic/about/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

Chan, Margaret. “Influenza A (H1N1): Lessons Learned and Preparedness: Keynote Speech at a High-Level Meeting.” World Health Organization (WHO), July 2, 2009. http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2009/influenza_h1n1_lessons_20090702/en/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

“Comparative Analysis of National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans.” World Health Organization (WHO), January 2011. http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/comparative_analysis_php_2011_en.pdf (accessed March 20, 2015).

“The Five Deadliest Outbreaks and Pandemics in History.” Culture of Health. http://www.rwjf.org/en/blogs/culture-of-health/2013/12/the_five_deadliesto.html (accessed March 20, 2015).

“H1N1 (Originally Referred to as Swine Flu).” Flu.gov . http://www.flu.gov/about_the_flu/h1n1/ (accessed March 20, 2015.

“Humanitarian Pandemic Preparedness Programme.” International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/health/diseases/pandemic-influenza/humanitarian-pandemic-preparedness-programme/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

“Informal Consultation on Influenza Pandemic Preparedness in Countries with Limited Resources.” World Health Organization (WHO). http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/CDS_CSR_GIP_2004_1.pdf (accessed March 20, 2015).

“Influenza: Public Health Preparedness.” World Health Organization (WHO). http://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/en/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

“International Health Regulations: Safeguarding Health in Emergencies through Legislation.” World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for South-East Asia (SEARO). http://www.searo.who.int/entity/ihr/topics/IHR_legislation/en/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

“Pandemic Flu History.” Flu.gov . http://www.flu.gov/pandemic/history/index.html (accessed March 20, 2015).

“Pandemic Influenza.” CIDRAP: Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/infectious-disease-topics/pandemic-influenza#overview&1-4 (accessed March 20, 2015).

“PREPARE: Pandemic Preparedness Project.” International Medical Corps. https://internationalmedicalcorps.org/prepare#.VM2OqC6YTXS (accessed March 20, 2015).

Rowe, Janet. “Deadly Pandemics through History.” University of Toronto Magazine, Winter 2013. http://janet297.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=15829647&item=7 (accessed March 20, 2015).

“What Is a Pandemic?” World Health Organization (WHO), February 24, 2010. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/pandemic/en/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

“WHO Checklist for Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Planning.” World Health Organization (WHO), 2005. http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_4/en/ (accessed March 20, 2015).

Full Text: 

Melanie R. Plenda

Source Citation

Source Citation   

Gale Document Number: GALE|CX3628100072

Disclaimer:   This information is not a tool for self-diagnosis or a substitute for professional care.