Audience effects and other-regarding preferences against corruption: Experimental evidence.

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Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Document Type: Report; Brief article
Length: 174 words

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Abstract :

Keywords Corruption; Bribery; Experiment; Transparency; Accountability Abstract We report results from an experiment in which two firms compete for a public project by submitting offers of quality and bribery to a public official. We study the impact of audience effects (transparency) and other regarding preferences (accountability) on corruption by introducing a citizen who either observes, or is affected by the transactions, or both. The results suggest that transparency and accountability lead, independently, to lower bribe placement and acceptance. However, the conjoined effect does not promote prosocial behaviour further, indicating potential ceiling effects. Author Affiliation: (a) Universitat Jaume I, Spain (b) Burgundy School of Business, France (c) Economix, UPL, Univ Paris Nanterre, CNRS (d) University of Innsbruck, Austria (e) New York University Abu Dhabi & Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, NYUAD Saadiyat Island, PO Box 129188, Building A5, Office A5 179, Abu Dhabi, UAE * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 28 May 2019; Revised 8 March 2020; Accepted 25 September 2020 Byline: Aurora García-Gallego (a), Nikos Georgantzis (a,b), Tarek Jaber-López (c,d), Georgia Michailidou [georgina@nyu.edu] (e,*)

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A648797486