Capital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economy

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From: Review of Managerial Science(Vol. 7, Issue 3)
Publisher: Springer
Document Type: Report
Length: 219 words

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Byline: Markus Ampenberger (1), Thomas Schmid (1), Ann-Kristin Achleitner (1), Christoph Kaserer (1) Keywords: Family firms; Capital structure; Leverage; Agency conflicts; G32; G34 Abstract: This paper analyzes the question if and how founding families influence the capital structure decision of their firms. By using a unique, partially hand-collected panel dataset of 660 listed German companies (5,135 firm years) over the period 1995--2006, we come up with the following results: German family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family firms. With respect to the question how families influence the capital structure of their firms, we can show that the family impact is mostly driven via management involvement. In this context, we also detect that the presence of a founder CEO has a strong negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests, including the influence of other types of blockholders and the firms' life cycle. Moreover, we use a propensity-score based matching estimator to alleviate concerns of reverse causality. Overall, our study suggests a strong, negative and causal relationship between family firm characteristics (especially family management) and the level of leverage. Author Affiliation: (1) Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS), Technische Universitat Munchen, Munich, Germany Article History: Registration Date: 28/11/2011 Received Date: 08/07/2011 Accepted Date: 28/11/2011 Online Date: 27/12/2011

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A334692179