Rent seeking and the regulation of a natural resource

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Date: Sept. 2001
From: Marine Resource Economics(Vol. 16, Issue 3)
Publisher: The MRE Foundation, Inc.
Document Type: Report
Length: 6,240 words
Lexile Measure: 1470L

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Abstract :

This article analyses rent-seeking behaviour among agents who compete for high future shares of a common natural resource. Rent-seeking behaviour occurs when the agents, based on earlier experience, expect that the distribution of the common natural resource in the future will be dependent on the agents' activities in the past. We show that allocation rules that make rent seeking individually rational, normally lead to scale inefficiency, input mix inefficiency, and fewer participants in the industry than lump-sum allocation rules. Key words Natural resource, regulation, rent seeking.

Source Citation

Source Citation   

Gale Document Number: GALE|A245953415