Moral impressions and presumed moral choices: Perceptions of how moral exemplars resolve moral dilemmas.

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Date: Mar. 2022
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Document Type: Report; Brief article
Length: 254 words

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Abstract :

Keywords CNI model; Deontology; Moral exemplar; Moral impressions; Utilitarianism Highlights * Investigated presumed choices of moral exemplars in moral dilemmas. * Perceived morality associated with greater presumed sensitivity to moral norms. * Unreliable differences in presumed sensitivity to consequences and general action aversion. * Suggests that presumed choices of moral exemplars may guide moral judgments. Abstract Previous research suggests that individuals who prefer deontological over utilitarian choices in moral dilemmas are perceived to have stronger moral character than individuals who show the reverse preference. To gain deeper insights into the link between moral choices and moral impressions, the current research used a formal modeling approach to examine whether morally exceptional figures are perceived to differ from others in their sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, or general action tendencies when resolving moral dilemmas. Findings from four studies (N = 980) suggest that perceived morality is associated with greater presumed adherence to moral norms in the resolution of moral dilemmas. For sensitivity to consequences and general action tendencies, findings were mixed and attributable to characteristics confounded with perceived morality. The findings suggest a hitherto unexplored mechanism underlying moral-dilemma judgments by which moral judgments are based on mental simulations of decisions by morally exceptional figures. Author Affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, 108 E Dean Keeton A8000, Austin, TX 78712, USA Article History: Received 22 June 2021; Revised 21 November 2021; Accepted 26 November 2021 (footnote)[white star] This paper has been recommended for acceptance by Dr. Joris Lammers. Byline: Bertram Gawronski [gawronski@utexas.edu]

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A690060601