Why is bribery pervasive among firms in sub-Saharan African countries? Multi-industry empirical evidence of organizational isomorphism.

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Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Document Type: Report; Brief article
Length: 286 words

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Keywords Bribery and corruption; Unethical business behavior; Institutional constraints; Organizational isomorphism; National business system Abstract Motivated by the prevalence and persistence of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) despite high-profile anti-corruption efforts, and by calls for more research on unethical organizational behavior by firms in Africa, we investigated the link between bribery in 12 SSA countries and the phenomenon of organizational isomorphism, long used to explain legitimate, but rarely, illegitimate firm practices. Analysis of 5989 SSA firms in three distinct industries known for high levels of bribery reveals direct positive relationships between bribery and its perception as frequently practiced in specific industries ("mimetic isomorphic effect"); institutional constraints on businesses ("coercive isomorphic effect"); and local market rivalry ("competitive isomorphic effect"). Institutional coercion is the strongest determinant of bribery, while imitation and competitive rivalry routinize the practice. However, the effect of isomorphic pressures on bribery practices varies across industries. Therefore, institutional redesigns, policy remediations and managerial actions to mitigate bribery must consider the cross-industry variations. Author Affiliation: (a) Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Ave, 208 Peter B. Lewis Building, Cleveland, OH 44106-7235, United States (b) Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, United States (c) Dept of Information Systems, Marriott School of Business, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 785 TNRB, United States (d) Mike Ilitch School of Business Administration,Wayne State University, 5201 Cass Avenue, Detroit, MI 48202, United States (e) Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Ave, 208 Peter B. Lewis Building, United States * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 28 September 2018; Revised 19 September 2019; Accepted 20 September 2019 Byline: Nnaoke Ufere [nufere@iservicex.com] (a,*), James Gaskin (b,c), Sheri Perelli (d), Antoinette Somers (d), Richard Boland Jr. (e)

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A615520290