Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure

Citation metadata

Date: Dec. 2015
From: International Studies Quarterly(Vol. 59, Issue 4)
Publisher: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc.
Document Type: Report
Length: 263 words

Document controls

Main content

Abstract :

Byline: William Spaniel, Bradley C. Smith When do states impose sanctions on their rivals? We develop a formal model of domestic power consolidation, threats, escalation, and imposition of sanctions. With complete information, the target regime's consolidation of power determines the result-leaders with stable control can weather sanctions and thus deter their imposition, while vulnerable leaders concede the issue. However, when an imposer is uncertain of a foreign leader's consolidation, vulnerable types have incentive to bluff strength. Foreign powers sometimes respond by imposing sanctions, even though the parties would have resolved the crisis earlier with complete information. We then hypothesize that opponents of newer leaders-particularly in autocracies-are more likely to suffer from this information problem. Employing the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data set and carefully addressing selection problems common to the sanctions literature, we show that sanctioners are indeed more likely to follow through on threats against such leaders. Article Note: We are grateful to Phil Arena, Tony Boyles, Rob Carroll, Nikolay Marinov, Cliff Morgan, Scott Wolford, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of International Studies Quarterly for helpful feedback. CAPTION(S): Appendix S1: Table S1. Results with non-threat sanctions cases dropped Table S2. Models with estimated tenure where precise data was missing Table S3. Model with issue-area controls Table S4. Model subsetted for security issue sanctions Table S5. Subsetted for economic disputes Table S6. Subsetting on human rights disputes Table S7. Model with leader tenure less than one year dropped Table S8. Bivariate Probit Selection Model Appendix S2. Proof of the Complete Information Game Appendix S3. Complete Proofs for the Formal Model

Source Citation

Source Citation   

Gale Document Number: GALE|A439973069