American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 51, No. 4, October 2014

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Date: Dec. 2014
From: The Review of Metaphysics(Vol. 68, Issue 2)
Publisher: Philosophy Education Society, Inc.
Document Type: Article
Length: 1,078 words
Lexile Measure: 1240L

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It's a Jumble Out There: How Talk of Levels Leads Us Astray, AMIE L. THOMASSON

One often hears talk about some entities being "higher-level" than others: social and cultural objects, for example, are often said to be "higher-level" entities than organisms; mental properties are often said to be "higher-level" than physical or neurological properties; and so on. Sometimes this is expressed as the idea that reality comes in ontological levels, strata of being. This article argues, however, that metaphysics is better off without making use of the idea of "levels." The levels metaphor is misleading and can generate pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems.

Practical Realism as Metaphysics, LYNNE RUDDER BAKER

The Fundamental Character of Metaphysics, JORGE J. E. GRACIA

The claim that metaphysics is fundamental has frequently been voiced in the history of the discipline. However, the usual ways this claim is justified do not appear effective. This article aims to fill this gap in metametaphysical theory by providing a credible justification of the fundamentality of metaphysics: first, by establishing a set of five conditions of fundamentality for the discipline; second, by showing that these conditions are satisfied when the object of study of metaphysics is identified with an ontologically neutral object; and the task of the discipline is taken to be the determination of the number and identity of the most general categories and the relation of less general categories to the most general ones.

A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality, JAVIER CUMPA

What are the fundamental inhabitants of the world? Is our world a world of Aristotle's ordinary substances, Locke's physical substances, Husserl's wholes, Wittgenstein's facts, Sellars's processes, or Quine's...

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A394231994