Catch regulation and accident risk: the moral hazard of fisheries' management

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Date: Winter 1997
From: Marine Resource Economics(Vol. 12, Issue 4)
Publisher: The MRE Foundation, Inc.
Document Type: Report
Length: 5,130 words
Lexile Measure: 1840L

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Abstract :

A theoretical model focusing on the interaction between safety and fishery regulation is introduced in order to discuss the fishing units' behavior and the public policies' effect upon fatality rates and cost efficiency in the industry. The optimal welfare outcomes for a nontransferable and transferable vessel quota regime are compared and possible advantages and disadvantages of practicing these fishery regulations are identified. Among other things, the authors recommend the public authorities pay attention to moral hazard effects which may follow when the levels of public risk reducing services are increased. Key words Catch and safety regulation, moral hazard, nontransferable and transferable quotas.

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Gale Document Number: GALE|A245951042