Risk attitudes and individual transferable quotas

Citation metadata

Date: Mar. 2006
From: Marine Resource Economics(Vol. 21, Issue 1)
Publisher: The MRE Foundation, Inc.
Document Type: Report
Length: 9,984 words

Document controls

Main content

Abstract :

An analysis of ITQ fisheries management is offered in which two different groups of agents facing uncertain harvesting costs take part. The first group, termed as the coastal fleet, is risk averse, while the second group, interpreted as the ocean fleet, is risk neutral. In contradiction to what is seen in deterministic models of quota markets, given strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion amongst the coastal fleet members, it is found that the initial quota allocation affects the equilibrium quota price and the final catch distribution influencing the economic efficiency in the fishing industry. Key words Transferable quotas, risk attitude, fishery management. JEL Classification Codes D8, H2, and Q2.

Source Citation

Source Citation   

Gale Document Number: GALE|A212277197